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Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
New Case Filed John T. Mitchell LEITZKE 6/27/2003 NEWC 
LEITZKE Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No John T. Mitchell 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Owens, James, 
Vernon & Weeks Receipt number: 0570774 





Summons Issued John T. Mitchell 
Ex Parte Motion For Temporary Restraining John T. Mitchell 
Order 
HILDRETH Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion John T. Mitchell 





Temporary Restraining Order John T. Mitchell JANUSCH 
PARKER Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 574049 Dated John T. Mitchell 
07/25/2003 for 3000.00) 
NORIEGA Affidavit Of ServiceIBrenda J. Lawrence /July 28, John T. Mitchell 
2003 
Affidavit Of Service/Found/Dougias John T. Mitchell 
LawrenceIJuly 28, 2003 
NORIEGA 
Filing: 17A - Civil Answer Or Appear. All Other John T. Mitchell 
Actions No Prior Appearance Paid by: Ian Smith 
Receipt number: 0575516 Dated: 08/06/2003 
Amount: $47.00 (Check) 





LE ITZKE Notice of Substitution Of Counsel (Samuel John T. Mitchell 







Notice of Substitution of Counsel John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Deposition of Harold Funk John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Appearance (Douglas Lawrence, Pro John T. Mitchell 
Se) 














Notice Of Proposed Dismissal Issued John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit Of Retention John T. Mitchell 
Inactivity Order Printed - File Sent to Judge John T. Mitchell 
ORDER OF RETENTION John T. Mitchell 
Case status changed: reopened John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 09/14/2004 04:OO PM) 












Affidavit of Harold Funk John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks John T. Mitchell 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
Motion For Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Appearance for Defendant John T. Mitchell 
Date: 711 612008 ~irs@?&i~ial District Court - Koatenai %&$g$ 
ROA Report 
User: LSMlTH 
Time: 07:47 AM 
page 2 of 9 Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 






Affidavit of John P Whelan John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Daniel E Rebeor in Support of Motion John T. Mitchell 
for Temporary Restraining Order 
CONT THORNE Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 09/14/2004 04:OO PM: Continued 
HRSC THORNE Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 11/09/2004 04:OO PM) 






Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial John T. Mitchell 
Amended Notice Of Hearing -- 11-9-04 @ 4:00 John T. Mitchell 
Pm 








Notice Of Service John T. Mitchell 
FILE #2 Created John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 








Answer To Counterclaim John T. Mitchell 
Request For Judicial Notice John T. Mitchell 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of John T. Mitchell 
Tower Asseet Sub, INC. 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMO 
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in John T. Mitchell 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFD 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan Regarding failure to John T. Mitchell 
secure and affd from Human Synergistics 
AFFD ROBINSON 
Request For Judicial Notice Hearing Date John T. Mitchell 
1 1-09-04 
RQHR ROBINSON 






Motion to Strike John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 





Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered John T. Mitchell 
Civil Disposition entered for: Lawrence, Brenda J, John T. Mitchell 
Defendant; Lawrence, Douglas P, Defendant; 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, Plaintiff. 
order date: 1 1/9/2004 
Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered John T. Mitchell JANUSCH FJDE 
5/9/2005 NOTE ROHRBACH File sent to Judge to have counsel prepare an John T. Mitchell 
Order 
Date: 711 612008 
Time: 07:47 AM 
Page 3 of 9 
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User: LSMITH 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judse 
ORDR JANUSCH 
VlCTORlN 
Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment & John T. Mitchell 
Entering Decree of Quiet Title 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
Paid by: John Whelan Receipt number: 0658480 
Dated: 07/07/2005 Amount: $9.00 (Check) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 658482 Dated John T. Mitchell 
07/07/2005 for 100.00) 
BNDC VICTORIN 
Appealed To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell APSC 
STAT 
VlCTORlN 




Notice of Lodging Transcript John T. Mitchell NLTR 
BNDV Bond Converted (Transaction number 9489500 John T. Mitchell 
dated 09/08/2005 amount 100.00) 
RECT LEITZKE 
LE ITZKE 
Receipt Of Transcript (Susan Weeks) John T. Mitchell 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of John T. Mitchell 
Transcripts For Appeal Per Page Paid by: John 
Whelan Receipt number: 0667858 Dated: 
09/20/2005 Amount: $1 53.75 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Appeal Transcript Cover John T. Mitchell 
Paid by: John Whelan Receipt number: 0667858 
Dated: 09/20/2005 Amount: $1 8.55 (Check) 
LE ITZKE 










Cash Bond Exonerated (Amount 3,000.00) John T. Mitchell 
Supreme Court Opinion John T. Mitchell 
Remittitur John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference John T. Mitchell 




Case status changed: Reopened John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
HRSC Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 06/13/2007 03:OO PM) set 







Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Memorandum in support of revewed motion for John T. Mitchell 
summary judgment 
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on John T. Mitchell 
05/14/2007 03:OO PM: Hearing Held Set 
WlCVO2-767 1 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
1211 012007 09:OO AM) I st Priority - 4 Days 




HULL AFFD Affidavit of John Mack in Support of Defendants' John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Enlargement 
Date: 711 612008 
Time: 07:47 AM 
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Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
513 112007 AFFD HULL Affidavit of John P. Whelan John T. Mitchell 
AFFD HULL Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence John T. Mitchell 
MOTN HULL Motion for Enlargement John T. Mitchell 
NOHG LEPIRE Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
6/5/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0611 312007 03:OO John T. Mitchell 
PM) Enlargement of time; shorten time; 
disqualification for cause - Whelan 
MOTN VlCTORlN Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Douglas John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence Filed 5-30-07 & Notice of Hearing 
VlCTORlN Reply Memorandum un Support of Renewed John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Summary Judgment 










Application for Order Shortening Time John T. Mitchell 
Motion To Disqualify for Cause John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of John John T. Mitchell 
Mack Filed 5130107 






Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0611 312007 03:OO John T. Mitchell 
PM) Set WlCV02-7671 - Weeks - Strike Affd 
John Mack & Portion Affd Doug Lawrence 
Order Shortening Time John T. Mitchell ORDR 
HRHD 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 06/13/2007 03:OO PM: Hearing Held set 
WlCV02-7671 - Weeks 
HRHD CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 06/13/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:OO PM: Hearing Held Set WlCV02-7671 - 
Weeks - Strike Affd John Mack & Portion Affd 
Doug Lawrence 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/13/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:OO PM: Hearing Held Enlargement of time; 
shorten time; disqualification for cause - Whelan 
HRHD CLAUSEN 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Disqualification for Cause 
ORDR CLAUSEN 
New File Created 3 of 3 John T. Mitchell FILE 
HRSC 
NAYLOR 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 08/07/2007 04:OO PM) Weeks - set 
wICR02-7671 
Motion for Reconsideration John T. Mitchell MOTN 
MOTN 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN Motion for Permission to Appeal from an John T. Mitchell 
Interlocutory Order 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan John T. Mitchell AFFD 
HRSC 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider John T. Mitchell 
08/06/2007 01 :30 PM) Whelan - CV02-7671 
Date: 7/16/2008 
Time: 07:47 AM 
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Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/06/2007 01:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Permission to Appeal - Whelan 








AMENDED Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Supplemental Affidavit of John P. Whelan John T. Mitchell 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Reconsideration 
Amended Supplemental Affidavit of John P. John T. Mitchell 
Whelan 
CLAUSEN 
AFlS MCCOY Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Opposition to Summary Judgment 






Motion to Strike John T. Mitchell 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff 






Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/07/2007 04:OO John T. Mitchell 
PM) Enlargement of Time; Strike; Request for 





plaintiff's opposition to motion to reconsider John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike or in the Alternative for John T. Mitchell 
Enlargement of time to File Responses 
New File Created ****4********** John T. Mitchell FILE 
HRSC 
JANUSCH 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/07/2007 04:OO John T. Mitchell 
PM) Strike All Whelan's Motions - Weeks 
Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell PARKER 
PARKER 
MOTN 
MOTN Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Douglas John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence Filed July 24, 2007 
MlSC PARKER Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of John T. Mitchell 





Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on John T. Mitchell 
08/06/2007 01 :30 PM: Motion Denied Whelan - 
CVO2-767 1 
Hearing result for Motion held on 08/06/2007 John T. Mitchell 
01 :30 PM: Motion Denied Permission to Appeal 
- Whelan 
DENY CLAUSEN 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider John T. Mitchell 
and Motion for Permissive Appeal 
ORDR CLAUSEN 
CONT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 08/07/2007 04:OO PM: Continued 
Weeks - set wICR02-7671 
Date: 711 612008 
Time: 07147 AM 
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Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
HELD CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 08/07/2007 John T. Mitchell 
04:OO PM: Motion Held Enlargement of Time; 
Strike; Request for Judicial Notice - Whelan 
HELD CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 08/07/2007 John T. Mitchell 
04:OO PM: Motion Held Strike All Whelan's 
Motions - Weeks 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 




Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
plaintiff's Motion for protective order re. defs John T. Mitchell 
notice of deposition 
MOTN 
OBJT MCCORD Objection to notice of depositition & demand for John T. Mitchell 
production of documents 
MlSC HUFFMAN Amended Notice of Deposition and Demand for John T. Mitchell 





Subpoena Duces Tecum John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Deposition and Demand for Production John T. Mitchell 
of Documents 
plaintiff's Motion for protective order re. defs 2nd John T. Mitchell 
notice of deposition 
MOTN MCCORD 








Motion for Enlargement John T. Mitchell 
Motion To Compel John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
VlCTORlN Supplemental Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in John T. Mitchell 







Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of John Whelan in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer 
AFFD VlCTORlN Affidavit of John Whelan in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 





Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Reconsideration 
CLAUSEN Order Granting Defendants' Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Enlargement 
ORDR 
Order Granting Defendants' Request for Judicial John T. Mitchell 
Notice of the Court Files 
ORDR CLAUSEN 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Strike John T. Mitchell 
Date: 71 1612008 
Time: 07:47 AM 
~irs&@;jicial District Court - K~otenai ~ountgzb 
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Tower Asset Sub lnc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
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Notice Of Transcript Delivery of Harold Funk John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Correct Judgment John T. Mitchell 
Stipulation to Plaintiff's Motion for Enlargement John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Doug John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence Filed September 10,2007 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants' John T. Mitchell 
Pleadings or in the Alternative for Enlargement of 
Time 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Portions of John T. Mitchell 









Amended Motion to Correct Judgment John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
Notice Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 09/24/2007 03:OO PM: Continued 1 
Hour 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 











Order on Motion for Enlargement John T. Mitchell 
Order on Motion to Compel John T. Mitchell 
Order on Motion for Leave to Amend Answer John T. Mitchell 
Second Amended Notice of Dposition and John T. Mitchell 







Notice Of Service Of Discovery John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Service John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 1 1/27/2007 03:30 John T. Mitchell 





Renewed Motion To Disqualify for Cause John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of john Whelan in Support of motion for John T. Mitchell 
Disqualification 
Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript from John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Dated 8/7/07 
NOTC CLAUSEN 
Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript from John T. Mitchell 








Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Additional Objections to Affidavit of Robert Hall John T. Mitchell 
Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From John T. Mitchell 





Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue John T. Mitchell 
11/27/2007 03:30 PM) Mtn Court Trial - Weeks 
Date: 711 612008 ~irs~$z$icial District Court - Kootenai CauntyFs; 
**&$**9 *3,& 
.@*a+ a 
Time: 07:47 AM ** t,4g5jy ROA Report 
Page 8 of 9 Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
User: I-SMITI-I 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 





Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/27/2007 03:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Substitute Real Property Interest - Weeks 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Opposition to John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiffs Renewed motion for Summary 
Judgment 
AFFD VlCTORlN Affidavit of John Whelan in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
MlSC VlCTORlN Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to John T. Mitchell 
Renewd Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Plaintiff 
AFFD VlCTORlN Affidavit of Raymond Goodwin in Support of John T. Mitchell 













Motion To Continue Trial John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Change of Address John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Substitution of Real Party in lnterest John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Service Susan P Weeks by Fax John T. Mitchell 
1 1 11 2/07 
NTSV GBROWN Notice Of Service forTower Asset Sub Inc on John T. Mitchell 
1 1-1 3-07 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 1 1/27/2007 03:30 John T. Mitchell 






Response to Second Motion to Disqualify John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Reply Memorandum in John T. Mitchell 







Exhibit List John T. Mitchell 
Witness List John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:30 PM: Motion Denied Renewed Motion for 
DQ - Whelan - 112 hour 
HELD CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on John T. Mitchell 
11/27/2007 03:30 PM: Motion Held Mtn Court 
Trial - Weeks 
GRNT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:30 PM: Motion Granted Substitute Real 
Property Interest - Weeks 
CONT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on John T. Mitchell 
1211 012007 09:OO AM: Continued 1 st Priority - 4 
Days 
ORDR CLAUSEN Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and John T. Mitchell 
Initial Pretrial Order 
Date: 711 612008 ~irs@$$icial District Court - Kootenat Count: g<ay 
Time: 07:47 AM ROA Report 
Page 9 of 9 Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
User: LSMITH 
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
HELD CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 11/28/2007 03:OO PM: Motion Held 
Weeks 
GRNT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:30 PM: Motion Granted Renewed Motion for 





Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/12/2008 09:OO John T. Mitchell 
AM) 5 Days - 1st Priorty 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying John T. Mitchell 
Defendants' Renewed Motion for Permission to 







Expert Witness Disclosure John T. Mitchell 
New File Created**** *********** 5 John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript of John T. Mitchell 
11/27/07 Hearing 
Return Of Service on Thomas Martinich (not John T. Mitchell 
found) 
Expert Witness Disclosure of Defendants John T. Mitchell 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence 
RTSV SHEDLOCK 
WlTD BAXLEY 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on John T. Mitchell 
05/12/2008 09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 5 Days 
- 1 st Priorty 
CLAUSEN Memorandum Decision and Order Granting John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute 




Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/23/2008 04:OO John T. Mitchell 
PM) Presentment of Judgment 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
($86.00 Directly to Supreme Court Plus this 
amount to the District Court) Paid by: John 
Whelan Receipt number: 0787294 Dated: 
3/19/2008 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: [NONE] 
BNDC VlCTORlN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 787296 Dated John T. Mitchell 







Notice of Appeal To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
Clerk's Certificate to Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/23/2008 John T. Mitchell 






Amended Appealed To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Transcript Lodged-Julie Foland John T. Mitchell 
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SUSAN P. m E K S  
.JAR,fES, V E m O X  & t%-EEKS, P.A. 
1873 N. Ldkewood Dr., Ste. 200 
Coeur dlAlene, ID 53814 
Telephone. (209) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (205) 664-1684 
ISB #4255 1 
Attorneys for Pjaintiff 
IN T& DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
S/IATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAT 
TOWER ASS+ SUB TPiC., a Delaware 




Plaintiff, I &EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RENEWED RilOTION FOR SUiMMARY 
JII'DGMENT 
DOUGLAS L A ~ N C E  and BRENDA J. 
LAWRI3-CE, busband and wife, 
Defendants. 
~ c f c n d h t  appealed this Court's rulings that: (1) Plaintiff had standing to bring a suit 
against ~efendbntn: (2) that the suit should not be dismissed for failure to name an indispensable 
party (thc land1 rd); and (3) that there was an express easement. T11e Supreme Court upl~eld the I 
I 
trial cowt7s rulmgs that Plaintiff had standing to bring Ille action and that t l~c  suit sl~ould not be 
I 
dismissed for fhilure to name an indispensable party. The Court concluded tl~at: "Tower wi 11 
I 
have standing do seek injunctive relief if it can establish it has an allcged lcgal right to bcncfit 
I 
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Prom the Blossoin M o u n t ~ n  Road easement. As lessee of the alleged dominant estate, Tower 
derives its right to use the alleged easement from its lessor, Hall." Tmtler Asser Sub INC t.. 
Lawrefice, 143 Idaho 710. 152 P.3d 581,  583 (2007) A rerni'tt1t-t~ was issued Februaxy 20, 2007. 
Defendants have taken no M ~ e r  action on tlle case. This renewed stunma0 judg-ent raises for 
the Court's consideration those otl~er theories of easement raised by Plaintiff in its complaint. 
Althougt~ contained in the original slltnmazy judgment, for ease of argument, this menlorandurn 
rej terates those facts and arguments previous1 y raised. 
I. UNDTSPUTED FACTS 
1. Tlze Defendants! Doug and Brenda Lawrence, o w  a fee simple interes* jtx real 
property describcd as the Northcast Q~axter of the Southeast Quarter, the East half of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter and the East half of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Soutlleast Quarter, all located in Section 21, Townshp 50 North, Range 5 Wcst Boise Meridian, 
Kootenai County, Idaho hereiizaftm referred to as the "Lawrence parcel". (See Weelcs Affidavit: 
filed herein.) 
2. The relevant portions of the chain of title of the Lawrence parcel are as foilows: 
Pike W. Reyxolds and Agnes E. Reynolds, I~usband and wife, owlled the parent puccl Erom 
which the Lawrence parcel was later segregated, then tmzsfenred it to Edwaxd P, Raden and 
Colleen J. Raden, husband and wife, and l-lasold I?. Marcoe and Vxola G. Marcoc, lzusband and 
wife. Radcns and Marcoes trailsferred the pasent parcel to Harald A. F m k  and Marle-ne A. F~mk, 
husband and wife. Funks segregated and transferred the Lawrence parcel to T-Turnan Synergistics, 
Inc., a Minnesota corporation. Human Syngergistjcs, Inc. t~a l s fmed  the Lawrence parcel to Don 
E. Johnston and Fern -4. Johnston, husband and wife, and John McHugh and Mary Ann 
bfEhfORANDUM SUPPORT OF RENETVED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 2 
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h$cHugh, llusband and wife. Jahnstans a11d McT-lud~s thcn transferred the Luwrencc parcel to 
Nat~onal hssociated Propefiies. Lnc.. an Idaho Corpora6on. National Assoeimcd Properties. Inc. 
btrans-ferrcd the Lawencc parccl ia Arman and Mary Jane Fmmanian, I-rusbat~d and \'~.ife. Amm 
md bFYlwy Jane Fmanism sold the property to Doug and Brenda Lawrence, husband a t ~ d  wife. 
See Weeks Affidavit in Suppox? of Motion for Summary I-t~dgment, Esihibits A-I. 
3. Plaintiff Spectra Site was assigned a leasellold interest with Ma& md Robert Hall 
in a parcel of property situated in the Sot~tliwest Quarter o.F Section 22, TOWI~SIUP SO North, 
Range 5 West, Boise hleridian, Kooienai County, Tdaho as described in the Complaint and 
2Ufidavit of Dan Rebear previously filed herein on Judy 22,2003. 
4. The relevant portions ofthe chain of title ofthe Hall parcel is as follows: 
Pjlce W. Reynolds and Agnes E. Reynolds, husband and wik,  owned the Southtvesr Quarter of 
Sect~on 22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County Idaho (parent 
parcel) from which the Wall parcel was later segregated. Reynolds transfel-red the parent parcel to 
Edward P. Radea and Colleen J. Raden. husband and wifc, and Harold I?. Marcoe and Vjola G. 
Marcoe, husband and wife. Radcns and Mxcoes transferred the parent parcel to Harold A. Funk 
and Marlene A. Funk, husband and wife. Funks segregated and eansfmred the fIall parcel to 
.Totm Rasmussen and Neil Chamberlain. Rasmussen and Chamberlain then transferred the parcel 
to James and Teresa Van Sky. Van Skys transfened the parcel to Switzer Comu~icat ions .  Inc. 
Switzer Comunications next transferred tlie pace1 to Term Corp. Term Corp. thcn iransferrcd 
the property to Mark Hall and Robert I-Eall. Mark I-Iall and Robert Hall leascd t11e site to Nextel 
West Corp. Nextel West Corp. assigned its lease to Spectra Site. See Weeks Affidavit. 
MEMOWNDUhl IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY J'LJDGMENT: 3 
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5. Bath thc Spectra Sitc parccl and the Lawreucc parcel were 11eld in unity of title 
until they were segregated by Harold mid MaIene Frmk. See Wceks Affidavit. 
6.  A private road traverses the Lawreilce parcel in tile Southeast Quwler of Section 
2 1. A survey of  this road as it crosses thc Lawrence parcel was recorded June 15, 1998 and 
placed the portion of the private casement road in the Southeast Quarter of Section 2 1 as lying 
within Tax ParceI No. 21-8500. See Weeks Affidavit in Support of h'foti011 far Summary 
.Judgment, Exhibit 2. The parccl over v+rhich this surveyed road is now jdenlified sls Kaotenai 
County Tax Parcel No. SONOSW-2 1-9000 because it was segregated out from Tax Parcel No. 21 - 
8500 in 1999 after the survey was recorded. This parcel co~ttinues to be owned by Lawences. 
See Weeks Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibits P and AA. 
7. In October 1966, General Telephone Corporation ("GTC") acquired a parcel of 
property from Reynolds located in the Soutlfwcst Quarter of Section 2'6, Township ST) North, 
Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai Cou~ity, Idaho The deed granimg the parcel in Section 
22 lo GTC also included an access easement over the Southeast Quarter of Section 2 1 (the 
Lawrence PaxceI) and the Southwest Quarter of Section 22, Townshp 50 North, Range 5 West, 
Boise Meridian, Kootcnai County, Jdal~o. See Weeks Affidavit in S~~pport  of Motion for 
S u m a r y  Judgment, Exhbits V and Exhibit FF, Wenker Afidavit. In July 19GG, GTC obtained 
a Right of Way Easement over the Southwest Quarter of Section 21, Townshp 50 North, Range 
5 West Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Ida110 for access to its equipment situated on Blossom 
Mountain. See Weeks Affidavit in Support of hfotion Fbr Summary Judgment, Exhibit W. In 
August 1966, GTC obtained a Right of Way Easement over the North Hal F o f  the Northeast 
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Quarter of Section 28, Township 50 North. Range 5 West Boisc hferidim. Kootenai County. 
Idaho. See Weeks Affidavit: ia Suppoxt ol: Ri/lotian for S m a r y  Judgment, Exhibit X. 
8 In 1967, CTC had a detail ofthe acccss road prepared by an engineer, together 
with detllils of its commmication facility The detail of the access road showcd the private 
easement road as ieaving the county road, Iravcrslng southeast tl~rough tbt: SoutIlwest Quarter of 
Section 2 1, then entering into the Nortli Half of Section 28 wherc it traveled soutl~ezzst for a 
distance in Section 25 and then turned northeast for the remainder of the distance, then entering 
the Southeast Q~~arter oFSection 21 and traversing northeasterly through the 1,awrence parcel 
m d  continuing northeasterly tl-rrough the Soutl~west Quarter of Section 22. ,Ee Weeks Affidavit 
in Support of h4otion for S u m a r y  .Tudgrnent, Exhibit Y. CTC's dctail map sl~ows tlze road in d ~ e  
same location as it existed and was used by F~lnk during hrs otwlership. See F W I ~  AMidavit. 
9. The private road used by GTC and Funk was ale only existing road that provided 
access to the parcels at the time that FLIII~S purchased the property. See Funk Affidavit. 
10. In July 1975, Funks sold the Soutl~east Y4 of the Southeast Y4 of Scction 2 1, 
To~vnsl~ip 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian la Human Synergistics, Inc. At the time of. 
the sale, Funks continued to own the property located in the Soutl~west Quarter of Section 22. 
W ~ e n  the sales agreement was drafted, it included a clause to address Funks' access across the 
Section 2 1 parccl being sold to allow continued access to their property in Section 22. Jtem 5 of 
tl~e agreement indicated that the Sectlnn 21 parcel bcing sold was subject to an ingress egress 
easement in favor of the property still held by Funlcs ovcr the existing road on the property that 
was being sold to Human Synergistics. See 'CVeeks nffdavit in Support of &lotion for Summary 
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Judgment, Exhibit E. It was not Funks' intent to latld Ioclc their Section 22 propeny upon thc 
sale of thi: Section 2 1 property. It was Funks intcnt to assure that they retained an easement over 
the existing road located in the So~ttlzeas? Quarter of Scetion 21 far ingress and egrcss to the 
property they coll.tinued to own in Se~tiorz 22. See Funk Affidmit. Fudc continued to use the 
private road for ingress and egress to Section 22 after the sale of the Section 21 property. See 
Funk Affidavit. 
1 1. In 1 996, Latvrenccs' irnmcdiate predecessors in title, Armaa and Mat-y Jane 
Fannmian, granted a written easement in Savor of John Mack over the private easement for 
ingress and egress to his l a d s  located in the So~~ihwest Qusxtcr of Sccrcion 22, whicl~ lye obtained 
Erorn 13arold and Marlene Funk. See Weeks Affidavit in Support of Motion for Suinznary 
Judgmer~t, Exhibit EE. In granting this casement, Fannanians recogn~zed this private road as the 
"historic access" for Mack and his predecessors in intcrest ~rsed for access to their parccls in 
Section 22. Mack's predecessors in interest were the Funks. See Weeks Affidavit in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit TI. 
13. The easement road was visible at the time Lawrences purchased their property. 
See Wcelcs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Sumnary Jud,vment, Exhibits GO and 1-TH. 
TI. S'L'h4MARY JUDGR4ENT STANDARDS_ 
The law is well established in Idaho that on a motion for st~mmary judgment, the trial 
court must determine whether the pleadings, deposition, and admissions, together wit11 &~davits, 
show that thcre is no gentline issue as  to any material fact and that thc moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Bonz v ,  Sfidwceh, 1 19 Ida110 539,541,808 P.2d 
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876,578 (1 991). The brrrden of proving thc absence of an issue of material fact rests at all times 
upan the moving party. .McCr~y 1'. Lyom, 120 Idaho 765, 769,520 P.2cl360.364 (1991); G C11' 144 
Fiarn.~s 1) Fank ir~igation Go., 1 19 Idaha 5 14, 5 17, 808 P.2d 85 1.854 (1 991). 
ln ,X R. Simpfor Cu. v. Rose4 Isid10 , - P.3d - (S.Ct. Opinion 3 1 706.2006). 
the court sel forth the requirement when thc case is a co~urt rial: 
" W e n  an action will be tried befare the court without a jury, the trial 
court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive al the most probable inferences based 
upon the undisputed evidicnce properly before it and grant tlie summary judgmcnt 
dcspite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Shawver v. H~ck fehen -y  Esrufea, 
L.L.C., 140 Id&o 354, 360-61, 93 P.3d 685,691-92 (2004). "The test for 
reviewing the inferences drawn by t l~e  trial, court is whether the record reasonably 
supports 'the inferences. " Td. 
111. DACKGROrnD 
AS noted above, a private easement road has existcd s i ~ ~ c e  at least 1966 whicli traversed 
portions of Sections 21,22 and 28 to access propetty in thc Southwest Qusuter of Section 22, 
Townsl~ip 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Iblaidian, Kootenai Coxu~ty, Idaho. This case arises 
from a dispute regarding the right of Tower to use the private easemmt road to access its leased 
property in the Southcvest Quarter of Section 22 (Section 22 parcel) as it traverses the property in 
the South~vest Quarter of Section 21 (Section 21 parcel) owned by the Lawrences. 
Both the Hall Section 22 parcel and the Lawrence Section 21 parcel were once part of a 
larger tract held under one common ownership prior to n division of the parccls by the Funks. A 
private road existed which provided access to bath parcels. Altl~ough its origin is unknown, it is 
apparcnt that GTC obtiLincd an easement over the road as early as 1966. Prior to the separation 
by Funks of the Lawrences' Section 21 parcel from the parent parcel. the private road across the 
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Section 21 parcel had been used by Funks as thc exclusive means to access their pr0per.t~ in 
Section 21 and Section 22. Even after thc sepaaclon of the Section 21 parcel. Funlcs continued to 
USE the private easement road .to access &cir Secti~n 22 parcel, and it was later used by Hall for 
access to their segegated parcel in Section 22. 
IV. ARCUMEXT 
A. Easement by Implication 
An easement can be formed by implicatioti from prior use. In order to cstablish an 
easement by implication from prior use, the party trying to estabilsh such a11 easement must 
demonstrate (I) u t y  of title or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the dominani 
estate; (2) apparent continuous use; and (3) the easement mnsl be reasonably necessary to the 
proper enjoment of the dominant estatc. Bear island W;rfer Assn. v. Brown, 125 I d d ~ o  717, 
725,874 P.2d 528. 536 (1 994); Cardwefl v. ,S"Plcrith, 105 Idaho 71,77,665 P.2d 1081, 1087 
(Gt..4pp. 1983): Close v Reixsink, 95 Tdaho 72, 76. 501 P.2d 1383. 1387 (1972), Davis v Cowlen, 
33 Idaho 204,210,360 P.2d 403,406-407 (1 961). Apparent continuous use refers to the use 
before the separation of the parcels that would indicate the roadway was intended to provide 
permsmcnt: access to tlte parcels. Curdwell v Smith, supra, at 78,665 P.2d at 1088. Strict 
necessity 1s not required for the creation of an implicd easement by prior use. All that is required 
is reasonable necessity, Thomas v Adadven, 142 Idaho 63 5. 1 32 P.3d 392 (2006). The party 
seeking to establish the easement ltas the burden of providing the facts to establish tlte easement. 
Id. a? 77,665 P.2d at 1087. 
Zn its later pronouncements, the Idaho Supreme Court expanded the law on easements by 
implication in Davis v Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999). In Davis, the plaintiffs 
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(Davis) sought to protect asl easement over thc propetty of defmdmt ((Pcacocli). Tlte parties' 
predecessors in interest establ~shed an easeln~ljt by resewE1Cioi1 to protect access to what later 
became the Davis parcel, ovcr artd across t l~e Peacock parcel. Thc road was the only usabjc 
mems o f  access to the Dax~is pareel antil the Davis's conswlcted another road along the south 
side of tlieir propefiy, also providing access. The Peacocks then blocked the original r o d ,  axid 
Davis brougl~t a quiet title action to establish an easement by implication across the original road. 
The trial court held that an easement by irnpIications existed and the Tdaho Supreme Corn? 
upheld the ruling. 
Thc Idal~o Supreme Co~ut in rcaching its decision first held that the slacccssors in interest 
to the original grantors of property could assert easement rights by i~nplicd or prior use. The 
court noted: 
[W] e believe there is no equitable reason for the distinction between grantors and 
grantees in the area of implied easeinents by prior use. One of tlte requirements 
for establjsbing an implied easernsnt by prior use is that there Iias becn open ,and 
continuous use of the casement prior to the severance of thc dominant and 
servient estates. This requirement ensures 111at thc buyer of the sentient property 
will havc notice of the preexisting use. Consequently, it is equitable to impose an 
easement on a buyer who already had   lot ice of i ts  existence. Tf~erefore, we hold 
that a successor in interest to the o17ginal grantor o F the scrvtent property can 
claim an implied easement by prior use. 
Davis, 233 Idaho at 641 -42,99 1 P.2d at 366-367. The court also reaffilmed that an impli.ed 
easement by prior use docs not require strict necessity, but raaer, only reasonable necessity. The 
court noted: 
Pcacoc1.c. argues that tlte Russclls also had access to their residence because 
the land they owned was bordered by Idaho Street on the west. He contends that, 
because the Russcll pt-opcrty was not landlocked, thcre was always access to the 
residence across their o w  property. Therefore. use of the disputed road \xas 
neither necessary, nor provided the only usable means of access lo the residence. 
Peacock's argument would be persuasive if strict necessity were required for an 
implied casement by prior use. T-iowever, as our cases have made clear, 
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reasonable necessity is something less thnn thc g e a t  present neec.ssity 
required for an essemenl implied by nccessi* See Bear island W&CY As.r h, 
125 Idaho at 725.574 P.2d 53 6. 131 Bear lsfund W ~ f e p .  A CP '17, tue held that  no 
implied easemcnt by prior use or neccssjty had been created. Id However. in so 
holding. we stated that the establishment of an eascment by necessity required m 
"even weightier showing of a great present necessity for the easement," as 
compared to the reasonable nccessity required fool- an casement by prior use. Iii: 
Td, 133 Idaho at 642, 992 P.2d 15 367 (emphasis added). Finally, the court in Davis stated that an 
easement by implication is not extinguisl~ed evcn if the necessity no longer exists. In 
discussing this issue, the court held as fa1 tows: 
Vlhile tl$s issue has not been previously addressed by our Court, it appears the 
well-established rule is that, u~llikc an ezlsemcnt by way of necessity, an implied 
easement by prior use is not later extinguisl3ed jf thc easement is no longer 
reasorial3Jy nccessary. 
This long standing rule 1s based on the theory that when someone conveys 
properly, they dso intend to convey whatever is required for the beneficial use 
and enioyment of that prope;rty, and intends to retain all that is required for tlie use 
and enjoyment of the land retained. Consequently, an easement implied by prior 
use is a true easement of a permanent duration. rather than a temporary easement 
which exists only as Tong as the necessity continues. See, e.g,, No~fcen v. 
McGnhan, 823 P.2d 622,631 (AIaska 1991); Thornpan v. Schuh, 593 P.2d 1138, 
1 145 (Oregon 1979); Story v. IJeficr, 540 P.2d 562, 566 (Okla. 1975). 
Additionally, an implied eascment by prior use is appurtenant to thc land and 
therefore passes with all ssubsequellt conveyances of tlie dominmt and servient 
estates. See Iiughes v State, 80 Idal-ro 286,328 P.2d 39'7 (1958); I.C. 9 55-603 
(stating that a transfer of real property also includes all easements attached to the 
property). 
Applying these rules to thc facts of this case, we agree with the diskict c o w  that 
because use of the road was reasonably necessary for the beneficial use of the 
Da14scs' property at tht: time of severance, an iinplied easement by prior use arose 
at that lime. Because that irnplicd easement is not extinguished by tile end of the 
necessity, the easement became appuT-tenant to the land and was subsequently 
transferred to the Davises at the time they purchased their property. 
In the present case, there was unity of title at the time of the severance of the dominant 
and servisnt estate. The road was in use by the Funks prior to the severance and was thcir so1.e 
access to both the Section 21 and Section 22 properties. It ivas their intent after the severance to 
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continuc to use the road as their access. Tl-rus. use ofthe easement was reasonably necessary for 
13t3 beneficial Ltse of the domiamt estate (Sectioi~ 22 property) at the time of thc severance. 
Givcn these elements, there was an implied easement by prior use which is appuncnant to the 
Capstx parcel. 
El. Prescriptive Easement 
The law of prescriptive casements was reiterated by the Court in Akws  li DL. fiT/igifc 
Consptrucfinlz, ~ R C .  142 Idaho 293. 303. 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005)- wherein tl-le court noted: 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an casement by prescription "must 
prove by elcar and convincing evidei~ce use of the subject property, w11icl1 is 
chmacterized as: (1) open and notorious; (2) cotttinuous and uninterrupted; (3) 
adverse and under a claim o.f right: (4) with the actual or imputed kno.cvledge of 
the owner ofthe servient tenement ( 5 )  for the statutory period.'' (Cite omitted,) 
The statutory period ill question i s  five years. (Cites omitted.) A claimant may 
rely on his own use. or l-re "hay  rely on the adversc use by tlic claimant's 
predecessor for the prescriptive pcriod, or thc claimant may combine such 
predecessor's use with tile claimant's own use to cstal~lish the requisite five 
eoi~tinuous years of adverse use." (Cite omitted.). Once the claimant presents 
proof of open, notorious, conti~~uous, uninterrupted use of the claimed right far 
the prcseriptive period, even .cvithout evidence of how the use began, hc raises the 
presumption that the use was adverse o;nd under a claim of right. (Cites omitted.) 
The burden then shifts to the ozvner of the servient tenement to show that tlic 
claimant's use was pcmissive, or hy virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. 
(Cites omitted.) The nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servicnt 
owncr's claims to the propefiy." The state of mind of the users of the alleged 
easement is not conhalling; the focus is on the natwe of their use. 
In Cardenas v. Kjtrrpjuwoit 1 14 Idaho 79,53, 753 P.2d 280,294 (1988), the Supreme Court held: 
A ""claim of dght" signifies use without recognition of the rights oSf the servient 
estate's owner.(Cite omitted.). The general rule is that proof of open, notorious, 
continuous and u~linterrupted use for the statutory period raises tbe rebuttable 
presumption that the usc was adverse and iuzder a claim of right. (Cite omitted.) 
Nonctheless, as  stated in Simmnns: "The use of a driveway in cornlnon w~th  the 
ewer and the general public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's 
pat indicating a sepaxatc and exclusive use on his part- negatives any presumption 
of individual right thercin in his favor." 
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When tlie road providing access to the FulLks' Section 21 atid Section 22 parcels was 
own. It is known ?hat jt was there as early as 1966. 11 is undisputed that 
Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 parcel and their Section 22 parcel 
prior to s egegahg  the parccls. M e n  Funks sold the Section 21 parcel to Human Syncrgistics, 
they included in the sales contract language thai gave notice that they intended to continue to use 
the road for ingress and egress to their retained Section 22 parcel. This langtmge providcd notice 
they were claiming a right to use the road in the future for ingress md egress to thcir retslined 
lands. It is undisputed that Funks and their predecessors then proceeded to use the road openly, 
continuotrsl y, wi.tf.tnut inlemption, under a ciairn of right for the statutory period. F;lrma~-iians (a 
predecessor of Lawrence) granted a an express easement for ingcss/egress to a portion of 
Section 22 to Funks' predecessor, Mack, recognizing Mack had a right to the easement because 
it was the historical access to Section 22. Thus, there is also a prescriptive easement across t h i s  
road. 
C . Easement by Necessity 
An easwnent by necessity lias somc similar elements to an easement by prior use. The 
Court in B&IDevelnpms~f & Inv., Inc. v. Parsons, 1.26 Idaho 504, 887 P.2d 49 ( c t . ~ ~ ~ .  1994) 
noted: 
To cseablish an easement by necessity, thc claimnant rn~ist prove the following 
elements: (1) that the dominant parcel and the servient parcel were once part of a 
larger tract ~mder common ownership; (2) that the necessity for the easement 
claimed over the servient estate exisred at !he tI'mc- of tkle severaace; and (3) the 
present necessity for the claimed easement is great. MacCaskiil v. Ehbcrf, 1 12 
Idaho 1 1 15, 1 1 18, 739 P.2d 41 4,4 17 (C1.App. 1987) (emphasis added). An 
easement by necessity is a creature of public policy. Rob Dn~liefs & Sons 1: 
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Feavev, I06 Idaho 535,543,613 1 P,2d 101 i),lD1S ( C a p p ,  2 984). Therefore, t11:lre 
easement does not depend on an express mutual agreement. Ra&ej-, it arises, and 
will be recognized, wlwn the three required elements 11avc bee12 estahlislled, 
Establishment of an casement by necessity i s  not defeated by a contrary 
expectation h~l?ored by one of the pm.ies. ;bZtncCaskili. 1 12 Tdaha a t  1 119, 739 
P.2d at 4-41 ri ,  It is a questioll of law. An o\mer af propelt-y. kowever, C W R ~  create 
the necessity by his or her own actions. Car&)ell v. Siniih, 105 Xdaho 71, 80, 665 
P.2d 108 1, 1090 (Gt.Agp, t 983). 
h~ the present casc, t l~c  dominvnl parcel and the scrvicnt parcel were once part of a larger tract 
under c o r n o n  owership. At the time of the severance, the necessity for the easement across the 
Lawence parcel existed. This necessity continues today as no other method of  road access 
exists to the parcel. Therefarc, the elements of an easement by necessity exists. 
V. CONCLUSTON 
For the foregoing seasons and under the foregoing legal tllearies, the Court sl~ould g a r  
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment auld issue a p m m e n t  injunction prohibiting 
Defendmts from -Further blocking Plaintiff's access. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2007. 
JAIVES? VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
BY: i)7@i%b 
Attorneys for Plaintie 
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i hereby certify that on the 14"' day of May, 2007.1 csused to be served a truc and col~cct 
copy of thc foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
U 3. Mail a Overni&t Mai I 
TZ1 Telccopy (FAX) 
John P. Whelan 
2 13 4"' Street 
Coeur d3Alenc, ID 83 5 1 6 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR S W f i R Y  JUDGMENT: 14 
036 
IN THE SG'fPmME ~ C ) U R T  OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
LA NCE, husband and wife, 1 Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, for the County of Kootenai. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 
The summary judgment order is vacated and the case is remanded. 
John P. Whelan, P.C., Coeur d7AIene, for appellants. 
Owen, James, Vernon and Weeks, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Susan 
P. Weeks argued. 
JONES, Justice 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence appeal to this Court from a summary judgment 
order declaring the existence of a thrty foot wide express easement across their property 
in favor of Tower Asset Sub Inc. We vacate the summary judgment and remand to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
1. 
This is the second of two cases involving the same basic question - whether 
property owned by the Lawrences is subject to an express easement for access to other 
property located near its eastern side. In the first case, Capstar Radio Operating 
Company v. Lawrence, 2006 WL , we considered the same two instruments 
that are involved in this case and determined that summary judgment in favor of Capstar 
was not appropriate because the documents m question did not unambiguously gant  an 
express easement over the Lawrence property. Capsfur focused prirnanly upon the 
wording of a 1975 sale agreenlent and secondarily upon a 1992 wananty deed. The 
decision here deals primarily with the deed. 
This case involves the right to use a private road, known as Blossom Mountain 
Road, located on Blossom hIountaia, south of Post Falls. Blossorn Mountain Road 
traverses the Lawrence property, which is located in the southeast quarter of section 21 
(the "Lawrence parcel"), crossing into the southwest quarter of section 22, where Robert 
Hall owns certain property (the "Hall parcel"). Tower Asset Sub Inc. currently leases and 
occupies the Hail parcel. 
The Lawrence parcel and the Hall parcel were once part of a single tract of land 
under the common ownership of Harold and Marlene Funk. In 1975, the Funks divided 
their land and sold what is now the Lawrence parcel to H m a n  Synergistics, Inc. while 
retaining the southwest quarter of section 22. The Funks and H u a n  Synergistics signed 
a sale agreement, which set forth that the parcel bought by Human Synergistics was: 
5. Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and 
adjoining property in said sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and 
including an ingress egress easement over portions of Section 21 
heretofore granted to the grantors. Said easement shall be over existing 
roads until such time as all record owners shall agree to the relocation, 
improvement and/or abandonment of all or any portions of any roads. 
Seventeen years later, in 1992, the Funks executed and delivered a warranty deed 
conveying the Lawrence parcel to H m a n  Synergistics. The warranty deed stated that the 
deed was given "in fblfillment of those certain contracts between the parties hereto dated 
July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the conveyance of the above described property." In 
1996, after a number of other conveyances, the Lawrences acquired ownership of their 
parcel. 
Tower initiated this lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief when the 
Lawrences refbsed to allow it to traverse Blossom Mountain Road. Tower argued it had 
the right to use Blossom Mountain Road to access its parcel, and alleged six causes of 
action to support its position: (1) express easement; (2) implied easement; (3) easement 
by necessity; (4) easement by prescription; (5) injunctive relief; and (6) breach of 
contrai;l. After Tower moved for s u m a v  judzoent, the district court ordered the 
past~es to lmi t  their discovery, briefing, and arguments to the issue of express easement, 
and therefore did not address Tower's other causes of action. On s u m a r y  judment, the 
distrrct court detemined the deed was ambiguous, considered extrinsic evidence, and 
ruled in fdvor of Tower on the express easement cause of action. The Lawrences appeal 
that judLment. 
11. 
in this opinion, we address three issues: (1) whether Tower has standing; (2) 
whether Hall is an indispensable party; and (3) whether the district court erred in 
declaring the existence of an express easement on summary judgment. In their briefing 
before this Court, the parties have argued a number of other issues but it is unnecessary to 
address them as a result of our ruling on the latter issue. 
M e n  reviewing a s u m a r y  judgment order, this Court applies the same standard 
as the district court. Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 41 5, 419, 1 1 1 P.3d 
100, 104 (2005). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a 
question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Infanger v. City of 
Salmon, 137 Idaho 45,47,44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002). 
A. 
The Lawrences contend that Tower lacks standing to bring t h s  suit because it 
failed to demonstrate an ownership or leasehold interest in the dominant estate. Standing 
is a subcategory of justiciability and is "a preliminary question to be determined by this 
Court before reaching the merits of the case." Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 
391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006). The district court's Order Granting Motion for S m a r y  
Judgment and Entering Decree of Quiet Title granted: (1) a judgment quieting title in the 
easement in favor of Tower, and (2) injunctive relief permanently restraining the 
Lawrences from interfering with Tower's use of the easement. The question of standing 
must be addressed with respect to each form of relief. 
This Court has established that title o~vnership is a prerequisite to quiet title to an 
easernent appurtenant in fayor of a dominant estate. Beach Lateral H'ater Users Ass 'a v 
ffarrison, 132 Idaho 600, 604, 130 P.3d 1138, 1142 (2006); Tuzgslen Holclzngs, h c .  v. 
Drake, 143 Idaho 69, 72, 137 P.3d 456, 459 (2006). However, we agee  with the 
Restatement (Third) of Property that an individual has standing to enforce the right to use 
an easement if be or she has the right to benefit From the easement. Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Semitudes S; 8.1 (2000). Therefore, title ownership of the dominant estate is 
not a necessary prerequisite to obtain standing to enforce the right to use an easernent. Id. 
Hall, who is not a party to this suit, is the record owner of the alleged dominant 
estate.' As a result, Tower lacks standing to seek a quiet title declaration in its favor. 
However, since standing to enforce the right to use an easement is consistent with the 
right to benefit from the easement, Tower will have standing to seek injunctive relief if it 
can establish it has an alleged legal right to benefit fkom the Blossom Mountain Road 
easement. As lessee of the alleged dominant estate, Tower derives its right to use the 
alleged easement from its lessor, Hall. 
We hold that Tower, as lessee of the alleged dominant estate, has standing to seek 
injunctive relief preventing the Lawrences from interfering with its alleged right to use 
the easement, but lacks standing to seek to quiet title to the easement. 
B. 
The Lawrences argue that the district court erred in proceeding with t h s  case 
because Hall was an indispensable party to the litigation. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
19(a)(l) provides a party shall be joined if: 
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among 
those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in 
the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the 
person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons 
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, 
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. 
Tower presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the benefit of the 
access road across the Lawrence parcel. However, that does not establish an express easement, whch must 
be created by a written instrument. 
Tb~s  Court has held that joinder of all parties with an ~nterest m the subject matter of the 
suit is not required; rather, only those who have an interest in the object of the suit should 
be joined. Pro hzdzvwo, Inc. v. itf~d-Mzle Holdz~zg Trust, 13 1 Idaho 741, 746, 963 P.2d 
1178, 11 83 (1 998): ldalro I~zgazion Go. v. Dzll, 25 Idaho 71 1, 716, 139 P. 714, 716 
(1914). 
As we have already detemined that Tower does not have standing to bring a quiet 
title action, we need not address whether Hall was an indispensable party to that portion 
of this case. With respect to Tower's request for injunctive relief, Tower's objective is to 
enforce its alleged right to use Blossom Mountain Road as an ingresslegress easement. 
This determination can be made without affecting Hall's rights because Tower need not 
quiet title to the easement in order to enforce any right it may have to use the easement. 
Therefore, Hall is not an indispensable party to the request for injunctive relief. 
c. 
The Lawrences contend that the district court erred in declaring the existence of 
an express easement over the Lawrence parcel. In reaching its conclusion, the district 
judge held that the 1992 warranty deed fkom the Funks to Human Synergistics was 
ambiguous2 and that the Funks intended to except an express easement across the 
Lawrence parcel in favor of the Hall parcel. 
An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is 
not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. Akers v. D.L. White 
Const., Inc. 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005). An express easement, being 
an interest in real property, may only be created by a written instrument. Shultz v. Atkins, 
97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948, 951 (1976) (citing I.C. $ 9-503; McKeynolds v. 
Harrigfeld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P. 1096 (1914)). "No particular forms or words of art are 
necessary [to create an express easement]; it is necessary only that the parties make clear 
their intention to establish a servitude." Benninger v. Denfield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 
P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006) (quoting Seccornbe v. Weeks, 115 Idaho 433,436, 767 P.2d 276, 
279 (Ct. App. 1989)). An express easement may be created by a written agreement 
Of interest is the fact that in Capstar the same district judge determined the sale agreement and deed to be 
unambiguous. There is no explanation as to why the deed would be unambiguous in that case, whle it is 
ambiguous in this case. 
between the owner of the dominant estate and the owner of the seniient es tak3 It may 
also be created by a deed from the owner of the senrient estate to the owner of the 
dominant e ~ t a t e . ~  Mihere the owner of the dominant estate is selling the property to be 
subjected to the servitude, an express easement may be created by reservation or by 
exception. "An express easement by reservation reserves to the grantor some new right 
in the property being conveyed; an express easement by exception operates by 
withholding title to a portion of the conveyed property." Akers, 142 Idaho at 301, 127 
P.3d at 204. 
In Capstar, the district court determined that the sale agreement, whch had been 
recorded in the county records prior to the recording of the warranty deed, was effective, 
in and of itself, to create an express easement by written agreement. We determined that 
the language in the sale agreement was insufficient on its face to establish an express 
easement. As an additional ground for granting s m a r y  judgment, the district court 
cited Seccornbe v. Weeks, whch we found to be inapplicable. In addition, we expressed 
reservations about the precedential value of its holding. 
As it did in Capstar, the district court held Seccornbe to be controlling in this 
case. For the same reasons we stated in Capstar, that holding is in error and must be 
vacated. 
In its bench ruling, the district court also determined the 1992 warranty deed to be 
ambiguous because it made reference to the sale agreement. The district court indicated 
that this and other evidence established the Funks' intent to "keep ingress and egress 
open" over the Lawrence parcel. However, the Funks' intent, whatever it may have been, 
is not sufficient to substitute for a writing that is effective to grant, reserve, or except an 
express easement. In Capstar, we held that the language of the sale agreement is 
insufficient to establish an express easement. There is no language in either the sale 
The record includes such an agreement. Shortly before the Lawrences purchased their property, their 
predecessors in interest entered mto a written agreement with the owner of property m the southwest 
quarter of section 22, granting him a forty foot wide nonexclusive ingress and egress easement over the 
portion of the Lawrence property traversed by Blossom Mountain Road. The property to be benefited by 
this easement was near to, but did not include, the Hall property. 
4 The record includes a deed wherein a predecessor in interest of the Funks granted an easement over the 
portion of Blossom Mountain Road traversing the Lawrence property to the General Telephone Company 
of the Northwest. That deed, dated October 16, 1966, benefited property owned by General Telephone in 
the southwest quarter of section 22, but not the Hall property. 
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ageement or the 1992 warranty deed, whether tile documents are considered separately 
or in conibination, that is sufficient to establish an express easement. 
Final resolution of this case u~ould have been expedited, had the district court. not 
confined its inquiry to the express easement issue. Based on evidence submitted to the 
court, certain of the other theories showed greater promise from Tower's standpoint and 
it is unfodunate that those theories were not h l ly  developed and decided upon. By 
confining its consideration to the express easement issue, justice in this case has been 
delayed. We hold that the district court erred in its conclusion that an express easement 
existed in favor of the Hall parcel, and we therefore vacate the summary judgment. 
111. 
The district court's order for summary judgment is vacated and the case is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Chief Justice SCJXROEDER, and Justices TROUT and BURDICK CONCUR. 
Justice EISMANN, concurring in part and concurring in the result. 
I concur in Parts lI.A. and I1.B. of the majority opinion, and 1 concur in the result 
with respect to Part I1.C. 
The district court's finding of an express easement in this case was based upon the 
1992 warranty deed from the Funks to Human Synergistics. The contract provided that 
the sale was: 
5.  Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and 
adjoining property in said sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and 
including an ingress egress easement over portions of Section 21 
heretofore granted to the grantors. 
MI )7"* ",f3 1 ""'J~ ' TK2cdn@a'Ef ;kcit& that-the &w6 had executed a deed conveying the property to Human 
j *t d - 5 -  . r l  
.-- - -$@ti-gistics arid providk'a that-; copy of the contract and a warranty deed would be 
W' &\)-- ,< .: 3@1:,7i I , w * ?i r* " 
placed in escrow. - ThafapparZitly was not done because the Funks later executed a 
mwqaqJs *g$y * 4@& &*f f& ,p r>t ,7 * * :?z 1 & 
warranty deed on November 18, 1992. That deed did not reserve or grant any easement. 
ad: 3 t r j r ; t ~m~ld - tk&- tb&ove -quo t ed  sentence in the real estate contract created 
an easement. The district c0.G did not explain how it could have done so. y ~ ~ ~ ? ~  -,* - ---.-.+ ,- -,- --.----- 
Under the doctrine of merger, any recltals in the real estate contract were merged 
into the deed. As we stated in Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Ikc., 90 Idaho 373, 382, 414 
P.2d 879, 884 (1966) (quoting Contirzental Li$e Ins. Go. v. Smith, 64 P.2d 377 W.M.)), 
"When a deed is delivered and accepted as perfomance of the contract to convey, the 
contract is rnerged in the deed. Thoush the terns of the deed may vary &om those 
contained in the contract, the deed alone must be looked to to determine the rights of the 
parties . . . ." There is no question that the deed in t h s  case was delivered and accepted 
in perfomance of the real estate contract. It recites that it was. 
This deed is given in Fulfillment of those certain contracts between the 
parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the conveyance of 
the above described property, and the covenants and warraaty herein 
contained shall not apply to any title, interest or encumbrance arising by, 
through or under the purchaser in said contract, and shall not apply to any 
taxes, assessments or other charges levied, assessed or becoming due 
subsequent to the date of said contract. 
The recital does not incorporate the contract by reference, but merely excludes fkom the 
warranties of title, quiet enjoyment, and against encumbrances any defect arising out of 
the purchaser's conduct during the time from the contract of sale to the issuance of the 
warranty deed. Thus, under the doctrine of merger, any purported reservation or grant of 
an easement in the real estate contract would be irrelevant. The district court erred in 
attempting to create an easement based upon the real estate contract. 
I, Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk of the Supreme Court 
of the State of Idaho, do hereby cettify that the 
above is a true and correct copy of 
entered in the above entitled cause 
record in my off'ie. 
WITNESS my hand and the S..I of m* 
STEPHEN W. KENYON 
-- - ------ _ - - ~ - - ~ - _ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ - _ & - - ~  --- -& P---- ------ ---- P -- -- 
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In the Supreme Court o f  the State ofdldaho 
TOiVER ASSET SUB ING., a Delawue 1 
corporatio~i, 1 
1 
Plairiti ff-Respondent, ? RIMITTITUR 
) 
V. 1 NO. 32092 
? 
DOUGLAS P. LAWENCE and Bl3ENDA J. 1 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 1 
1 
Defendants-Appellants. ? 
TO: FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI. 
The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause January 26, 2007, which 
has now become final; thereFore, 
IT IS HEREBY O R D E E D  that the District Court shall forthwith comply with 
the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required. 
DATED this 2ot" day of February, 2007. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge 
SLTSkY P. WEEKS 
JAkIES. VERNON & 'U7EEKS, P.A. 
1875 N. Lakexwood Dr., Ste. 200 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (203) 664-1 684 
TSB if4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
THE DISWCT COURT OF THE FIRST IUD?)ICIhL DISTRICT OF TKE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
T O W R  ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff. 
( Case No, CV 03-4621 
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JTDGMENT 
VS. I 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husbmd and wife, 
Defendants. I 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, by and ihrough their attorney of record, and moves the  
Court pursuant to LR.C.P. 56 for a1 order granting summary judgment in favor of the above- 
named Plaintiff for relief demanded in the complaint. 
The grounds for this motion are that there is no genuine issue in this case as to any 
material fact and the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment ns a matter of law. This motion is based 
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JC'DGMENT: 1 
upan I .R.C.P. 56. the anachcd memorandum in suppart o f  U~is matinn. and the affidavits and 
docume~lts on file herein. 
Oral argummt i s  respectfully requested. 
DATED this 1 4t1' day of May, 2007. 
.TAMES, VEREON & %%EKS, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
I hereby certify that on the 14"' day of May. 2007.1 caused to be servcd a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
U U.S. Mail C)vcrnigltt Mail 
d Hand Delivered Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Whelan 
2 13 1.1.~ Sttect 
C o ~ u r  d' Alene, TD 83816 
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JU'DGrnNT: 2 




@q$? 4g*, *A? 
JOHN P, WMELAN, P.G, 
21 3 N. 4'h Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele,; (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER SUB ASSET INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 1 
CASE NO. CV-03-04621 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN 
HEARING DATE: June 13, 2007 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai 1 
I. John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1 .  I am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence. I have personal knowledge of rhe following facts and could 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHEL4N - 1 0-18 
competently testify. This affidavit is  filed in support of Defendants' motion for 
enlargement. 
2. The Defendants have not had the opportunity to gather the 
affidavits and deposition testimony needed to oppose Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. It: is the intent of Defendants to take the deposition of each 
witness who has filed an affidavit for Plaintiffs in this action. Unfonunately, the 
witnesses are scattered across the United States and Defendants have not been 
able to track down each witness, much less take their depositions. So additional 
time i s  needed to oppose the Plaintiff's rnotion for summary judgment, I would 
estimate that an additional sixty (60) days from the date scheduled for the 
motions Oune 1 3, 2007) would be sufficient. 
3 .  The motion for enlargement on behalf of Defendants is made on the 
additional ground that, in the case of Capstar, Plaintiff only noticed-up i t s  
Motion for Summary Judgment yesterday, as it had previously scheduled only a 
motion shortening time for June 13, 2007. Additionally, the Plaintiff has failed 
to last or articulate which part of the Court records is being relied upon for the 
facts in support of i t s  motion. I am therefore forced to search through 
thousands of pages of my files pertaining to this matter to determine what 
issues must be addressed. Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel did not give any 
advance notice of her intent to pursue two separate motions for summary 
judgment. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WWELAN - 2 
BATED this -50 day of May, 2007. 
Whelan 
y for Defendants 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 30 day of  May, 2007. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHElAN - 3 
fi 5 I. -, . : I ; ~   ) ,-, - , ) 3 7  < 1 6  55 Fa;!' T;F-:d22411 , inhn P ' ! / P e l a n ;  P C * C : I ' o ' T i  B E P T  Q()4/024 
#f&Z*\ pj&3* B#:qi* 
fg*g7>3za pP??- 
egib" &g5**i9 W~~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 90 day of May, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon B Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N, Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814 
.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
J O ~  n. w m ~ m ,  P c 
2 1 3 N 4T" street 
Caeur d' Mcnc, Idaho 83 8 1 4 
T e k  (208) 664-5 891 
Fax. (208) 664-2240 
ISBg 6983 
IN DISmCT COURT OF THE FIRST J'UDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF iDAHO, A N D  FOR COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUE3 WC, 
a Delewate Corporation 
Plainriff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and 
BWN'DA J .  L A W N C E ,  Husband 
and Wife 
Defendants. 
1 CASE NO. CV-03-4621 
1 
) AFFTDA-T OF JOHN 
1 MACK 11V SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANTS MOTION 







S T A E  OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, John W. Mack, after bcing duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say: 
1. I make this Affidavit of my own personal knowledge. I am over the age of 1 8 . 1  
am knowledgeable of the facts and issues re~arding this matter and am competent to 
testify to thc facts crzntaincd in rhis afXidavix. Ir is me and correct 'to xhe be% of my 
knowledge. 
AFFTDAVXT OF JOHN MACK TN SUPPORT OF DEFENDATWS MOTION FOR 
ENLAEtGEJMENT 
2 In t 992,l purchased 1 5 1 acres in the Southest Q u a e r  of Section 22, Towaship 
50 North, Range 5 West from Harold and Mrdene Funk. This sale conveyed the 
remaining interest of the Funk's original 1969 land purchase to me, 
3 This (my) property completely surrounds the 1 acre parcel owned by Ha11 as well 
as four other p a r d s  owned by various business entities operating radio towers. In order 
for Tower Asset to gain vehicular access to their site, they must ingress and eqzess across 
my land. 
4 When I purchased the prope~ty in 1992, there were two roads that provided 
vehicular access to the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 One road enters my property via 
Signal Point Road from the west-southwest, across the parcel now owned by rhe 
Lawrences. The other road enters my property via Mellick Road from the north. 
5 .  Even though I have occasionally used the access from Signal Point Road, my 
preference has always been to use the road from Nellick. Because of my preference to 
use the Mellick aceess road, last summer I made significant improvements which 
included widening and graveling. 
6. 1 have read the affidavit of Harold Funk and I take issue with his statement in 
paragraph 4 in which Mr. Funk states that Mellick Road did not provide access to his 
property in Section 21 and 22. That statement is simply not correct. The 1969 Funk land 
purchase included Government Lot 3 in section 15, Government Lot 4 in sedion 22, and 
land lying in the southwest quarter of Section 22. These parcels are contiguous and 
Melli~k Road extended inro the parcel owned by Harold Funk in Section I5 and 
connected directly ro the other access road. 
053 
AFFlDAVlT OF JOHN MACK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR 
ENLARGEMENT 
7 1 have also read the fidavit t-tf John Rmk and I take similar issues with Mk 
Rook statements that the access road to Signal Point Road was the only road that 
provided access to the property in Section 22 His datement is just not correct for the 
same reasons 1 speciFled above 
DATED this 30th day of May, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to behre me this 3 
W, Mack 
0th day of May, 2007 
Residing " at - 
Carn,~i~ission expires --YQ@J 
AFFTDAVIT OF JOHN MACK SUPPORT OF DEFENDAMS MOTION FOR 
ENLARGEMENT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of Nay, 2007, 1 caused ta be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed ta the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewaod Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, 10 8381 4 
U S.  Mail, postage prepaid 
'la: -kcs imi le :  ( L O R l  6641 684 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4'h Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele,: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
iSB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER SUB ASSET IMC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. , 1 
CASE NO, CV-03-04621 
MOTION FOR ENMRCEMENT 
HEARING DATE: June 13, 2007 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
CONES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their counsel o f  record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motions this 
court, pursuant to  Rules 6(b) and 56(c) and 56(f) of the Idaho Rules o f  Civil 
Procedure, for an extension o f  time in which to file their opposition in response 
to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendants request to  file their 
response on or after August 15, 2007. The affidavits o f  John P. Whelan, Doug 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 1 
Lawrence and John Mack are offered in support af this motion. Defendant's 
request oral argument. 
This motion js made on the grounds that Defendant's have not had the 
opportunity to discover the whereabouts of the various witnesses whose 
affidavits are relied upon by Plaintiff. Defendants intend to depose each and 
every witness who has filed an affidavit for Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff has 
failed to identify what documents it relies upon in seeking i t s  Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Consequently, Defendant's counsel has had to review 
thousands of pages of the files pertaining ta this matter in an effort to 
determine what issues must be addressed in the opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Lastly, no notice was given by Plainaiff's counsel that she 
intended to renew her Motion for Summary Judgment . 
DATED this 50 day of May, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
A orn for Defendants jUheian 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of May, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the  foregoing by the me thod  indicated below, 
and addressed to the following; 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Via: JFacrirniie: - (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N , 4Ih Street 
Coeur d'Alcne, ID 83 81 4 
Teie.: (208)  664-5891 
Fax- (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 608 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDIClAL DISTRIm OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defe ndanrs. 
CASE NO. CV-03-462 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS 
LAWRENCE 
HEARING DATE; June 13 ,  2007 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John 1. Mirchell 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, Douglas P. Lawrence, after being duly sworn ulpon my oath, depose and 
say: 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 1 
1 .  I make this Affidavit of my own personal knowledge. I am over the age of 
18. 1 am knowledgeable of the facts and issues regarding this matter and am 
competent to testify to the facts contained in this affidavit. It i s  true and correct 
to the best of my knowledge. 
2. In July 1996, my wife and I entered into a sale agreement to purchase 80 
acres in the Southeast Quarter of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 West 
from Arrnan and Mary Jane Farmanian. We have owned this parcel of land for 
over 10 years now and have been in litigation over the use of our private road 
for nearly 9 years. I have studied the history of this road thoroughly and can 
speak with some authority on the matter. 
3. In October of 1998, 1 called Harold Funk on the telephone. 1 called him to 
clarify my understanding of the language that was contained in the Sales 
Agreement between the Funks and Human Synergistics; the same language the 
Plaintiff Capstar claims was a reservation of an easement. In a follow-up letter 
that Harold Funk mailed to me in November 1998, Mr. Funk reassured me that 
the language was not a reservation. But rather, it was merely to except, from 
title, an easement that was previously granted to GTE. 3.t: &TIficHb6, 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 2 
4. In March of 2004, Mr. Funk gave the plaintiff Tower an affidavit, which 
the plaintiff now relies on to support a motion of summary judgment, in which 
Mr. Funk makes a direct contradiction to the signed writing [ have from him, 
Contrary to his writing to me, Mr. Funk now claims in his affidavit that the 
language in the sale agreement amounts to a reservation. In light of Mr. Funk 
contradictions, I believe the Court should impeach any testimony coming from 
Mr. Funk. 
5. Also in his affidavit, Mr. Funk claims that Nellick Road did not provide 
access to the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 or the Southeast quarter of 
Section 21. This statement is just false. My wife and I have, on several occasions 
dating as early as 1 996, driven our vehicle all the way from our property in 
Section 2 1 to Mellick road. 
6. Also in his affidavit, Mr. Funk claims that had he not reserved an 
easement across the now Lawrence parcel, that his land in Section 22 would 
have been landlocked. Mr. Funk knows this statement to be false as well. In 
order for Mr. Funk to have a legal easement to his land in Section 22 (through 
the now Lawrence parcel), the Funks would have need an easement across the 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 3 061 
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Northeast Quarter of Section 28.  The Funks never obtained a legal access across 
parcel that precedes the Lawrence parcel travelling from Signal Point Road and 
therefore his land i s  Section 22 was landlocked irrespective of the Lawrence 
parcel. The Funks as grantors could never convey a legal access from Signal 
Point road because they never obtained a legal access. 
7. Also in his affidavit, paragraph 9, Mr. Funk states: "At rhe rime of the sale 
in 1976 to Rassmussen and Chamberlain, access to the parcel was by use o f  rhe 
same private road that had been continuously used since we first purchased the 
property." I take issue to this statement on this point. In an affidavit Harold Funk 
gave to the Kootenai Electric Cooperative in February 2001 , he states "We 
(Harold & Marlene) resided in Kootenai County, /daho from 1967 unril Ha rdd  
Funk moved in the fall o f  1975 and Marlene Funk moved in 1976 after we sold 
our house."Clearly, if Mr. Funk moved to American Falls in 1975, he wasn't 
continuously using the access road across the Lawrence parcel. I think its save to 
say that Mr. Funk's use of the access road probably did not extend beyond 
1 975. If he did use it past 1 975, the use was infrequent at best. Certainly, it was 
not continuous as he would have this Court believe. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 4 06') 
8. Access to  my propefly, is  controlled by three gales. The first gate i s  
located at the end of the county maintained poeion of Signal Point road, The 
gate was erected in December 1995 and has been locked continuously since that 
time. Another gate is located on Wilber Mead's property and was locked from 
1966 through 1998. In 1998 Wilber Mead removed the lock at which time I 
placed a lock on my gate. My gate has been continuously locked since 1998. 
9. In 1997 1 entered into a License Agreement with Mextel Corporation, the 
predecessor in interest to Tower Asset. Through this License Agreement, Nextel 
and their successors pay me a monthly rental fee to ingresslegress across my 
land to get to their tower sire. They have continued to pay me this rental fee 
since the License began in 1997. 
10. Sometime aaFt.er 1998, 1 met with Clear Channel Management (Capstar). 
They informed me that they no longer operate any equipment from their site on 
Blossom Mountain, but rather rent out the tower facility to other tenants. 
11. Sometime after my meeting with Clear Channel, I did enter into a 
License agreement with one of Clear Channel's tenants, Great Northern 
Broadcasting. This license agreement was similar to the Nextel Agreement in 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 5 063 
that they paid me for access across my road. Great Nonhern Broadcasting 
honored this agreement until sometime around the time Capstar filed suit 
against us; at which time Capstar was able ro get a Temporary Restraining Order 
against us and we had to give them a key to our gate. 
DATED this 30th day of May, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me rhis 30th day of May, 2007 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 6 
DLAGLAS P. A N D  BRENDA J. LAWRENCE 
PO %x 1027 
Coctuf d'&ana, ill 83816-1027 
phone (208) 663-2030 
amas1 lrmOO*dl& own 
Mr. Haald F& 
865 Ptllmore 
Arrierican Fads, Idaha 8321 1 
Reference: Blossom Nounbin - SF section 21 
Dear Harold: 
I want to rhsnk you far taking the time Im week in helping mc undersmd the language contained in the 
Sdes Agreement b e h e n  you and Human SynsrgisdO. It is somewhat ambiguous and your help is vcry 
much appreciated. 
I have anached a copy of tile Sales Agrccmenr for your r d e w  and recollecrion. Unfortunately, the 
reproductjon quality is not very p o d  and ir's lard to read. So to help thc marttr. 1 have f e w  the 
paracaph in qwstian (I& coiumrc) and have typed the explanation as I u n d e m d  i t  to be (right 
c a l m ) .  
Subject to and including an ingress c g W  e~semcilt .-, In October 2966, Pike Reynolds sold a 1 acre parcel ro 
over \iLis MU adjoining property in saia satlons 2 A GTE in IhesW Scation 22. Pike deeded ro GTE an 
and 22 awned by thc grantor easemerit for ingresdegrea across the SE Sectctjon 2 1 
and che SW section 22 of which this property became 
subject to. 
and in~1udmg an in- a s m e n l  over .-+ In Nwcmber 1972, Harold Funk purchawd an 
portions af Section 21 heretofore granted to the ingrcssiegress cascrnent from Wilber Mead across the 
grantor. %us! wrnen'b shall be over existing roads SW section 21 for rhe benefit of the lands awned by 
until such umc as all record awncfs shall agree- to .&mld Funk in Secuons 21,22, and 15. Ths 
rhc relocation, improvment andlor abandoment of easement is to nin with the existing roads until all 
atS or my portions of any roads. This easement is  
also over simflar lands in S d s n  2 5. 
I have reviewed this document and a m e  - 
with rhc ~ l ~ c ~ i ~ n .  Mr. Harold Funk /' ' 
Mr. Funk, 81 have the mr=cct udm~lrulding of this language, would you please sign and return this 
document to me at your earliest convenience. Also, pleas  f f f i l  frec to add any tl~oughts you feel 
applicable. Thank you saAmuch for yaw help in this -mr. A copy has been included for your. recards. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of May, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following* 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
5. Nail, postage prepaid 
(2081 664-1 684 
Joh P, helan 1 "( 
SIJSAN P. W E K S  
JAMES. VERNON & mEIKS, P.A. 
1875 N, L&etvoo$ Dr., Ste. 200 
CLeur d'istlene, TD 83 8 14 
Telephone: (258) 667-0585 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
ISB $4255 
Attorneys for Plsntiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DTSTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, n\T AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAX 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA f .  
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 03-4621 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS 
OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS 
LAWWNCE FILED 5/30/07 
NOTICE OF HEAJUNG: 
J u ~ ~ 1 3 . 2 0 0 7  p3AL 
Time: 3:00 p.m. 
Judge: John T. Mitchell 
CONES NOW Plaintiff and pursuant to Rule 56 (e) and Rule 7 (b)(3)(B), Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedui-e, hereby moves to strike portj.ons of the amdavit of Douglas Lamence for the 
reasons enumerated herein. Regarding affidavits submitted in support of sumrnaq judgment. 
Posey v. Fclrd Motor Credit Co., 1 1 1 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005) discussed the requirement 
thad evidencc submitted by affidavit must be ad.missihle to be considered by the court. Tilerein 
the court noted: 
MOTION TO STRIKE: 1 
Pasey argues that nearly the entire asdavit i s  inadmissible because it does not 
show &3t the matters averred to are based on personal knowledge, contams 
coacl usory asscrti ons, contains indmissi bl e hearsay md provides no foundation 
for il-ttroduction of attachcd exhibits, Posey's positioa 1s well taken. 
Affidavits sx~pporting or oppos~ng a su~nmary judgment motion must be made on 
personal krrowledge, must set: forth such facts as would be admissible jut evidence, 
and must show affirmatively that the a san t  is competent to testify to the m a ~ e r s  
stated. Jdaho Rule o f  Civil Procedure 56(e). These requirements "are not satisfied 
by an d5davi.l: that is conciusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by 
persond knowledge." (Cites omitted.) 
The Posey v. FordMotor Credit Co. coud hither noted: 
Eight docmcnts are attacl~ed to tlie affidavit. No fotundation is provided 
concerning who prepared the documents, several of which, on their face, indicate 
that they were not prepared by Ford but by the Caldwell dealership. The 
purports to identify the docummts without demonstratiou of the requisite personal 
knowledge for autltentication of the docurnettis pursuant to I.R.E. 901 and 
includes arguments as to the documents' legal effect, none of which is admissible. 
(Cite omitted.) To the extent that the documents are of'fered to show the truth of 
assertions contained within them, the documents are hearsay for whicl-1 no hearsay 
rule exception has been established by the Griath affidavit. In Stare 11, IJill, 140 
Idaho 625,97 P.3d 101 4 (Ct.App. 2004). we described the foundational 
requiremenls for application of I.R.E. 803(6), the exception to the hcassay rule for 
busiiless records: 
Rule 803(6), the business record exception to tlie hearsay 
rule, allows admission of a record or report if it was made 
and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity and if it was the regular practice of that business to 
make the report or record. See Hcnder.son v. Smifh, 128 
I&ho 444,450, 91 5 P.2d 6, 12 (1 996); In the Interesc of 
S. W ,  127 Idaho 5 13,529,903 P.2d 102,109 (Ct.App. 
1995). These foundational requirements must be shown 
through "tl~e testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
wihless." I.R.E. S03C6). That is, the record must be 
authenticated by someone "who has custody of the record 
as a regular part of hts or her work or wlto has supervision 
of its creation." Henderson, 128 Idaho at 450, 91 5 P.2d at 
12. A document is not admissiblc under I.R.E. 803(6) 
unless the person testifjzlng has a persol~al knowledge of 
the record-keeping system used by the business vvhjcl~ 
created the document. Id.; Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Tdaho 
293,297,900 P.2d 291.205 (Ct.App. 1995). 
MOTION TO STRIKE: 2 
Hill, 140 Jdaho at 628, 97 P.3d at 10 17. The mere reccipt a.nd 
retentjon by a business entity o f  a document that was created 
elsewkere docs not transfo'onn tlne document into a btlsiness record 
of the receiving e n ~ t y  for purposes d1.R.E. X03(6). Id.; Tn 
the l~ t e res t  ofS K .  I27 Xd&o 57 3, 520, 903 P.2d 102, 109 
(Ct.iZpp. 1995). Friffith's fidavit does not comply with the 
requiremen~s of Rule 803(6) with respect to any of the records 
attached to his affidavit. 
Tbe following portions of Mr. Idawrcnce's affidavit should be stricken: 
1. Paragraph 3 of Mr. Lrzwrence's afidavit contains inadmissible hearsay and should 
2.  Paragraph 6 presents argum,ent, and slsould be stricken. 
3. Paragrap11 7 presents = v e n t  and should be stricken. 
4. Paragraph 8 contains inadmissible hearsay and sh0~11.d be striclcen. 
DATED this 6' day of June, 2007. 
.TAMES. VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
BY: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Attorneys for PI aintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERmGE 
I hereby certify that on the fiTH day of June. 2007, T caused to be sewed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
U.S. Mail 13 Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 4' d Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Wilelan 
213 4th Street 
Coeur dl Alene, ID S3 8 16 
SUSAhT P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P A. 
1175 N. Lakcwood Dr., Ste. 200 
Goeur d' Alme, ID 3 3 8 1 4 
Teleghotle: (205) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (205) 664- 1684 
TSB ifc1255 
Aflomeys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE. FIRST NDIGTAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, I 3  AhKl FOR THE? COUNTY OF KOOTEKAT 
Plaintiff; 
VS. 
TOWER ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
REPLY mMOWYDUN IN SUPPORT 
OF Rl2NEWlEI) MOTION FOR 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. CV 03-462 1 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 1 LAWRENCE. husband and wife, I 
I 
Defendants. I 
Defendant has submitted the -davit of Douglas Lmence ,  apparentiy in opposition of 
the motion. Much of the affidavit i s  inadmissible. S0rn.e of it presents argument. To the extent 
this affidavit presents argument, it is addressed herein. 
Mr. Lawrence apparently requests that this court not give credence to Harold Funk's 
amdavit because of a letter that Defendants o'otail~ed from Mr. Funk in 1998 wherein he 
indicated 16s understanding of the terms included in the Sales Agreem.ent. M-1:. Lawrence claims 
WPLY MEMORANDUM IP4 SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT: 1 
071 
u u  uu L U O  i i n ,  a J L W ~ ~ O C J ~ ( L ~ C ~ L (  
PAGE M91 14 
rbat this lettcr, prepmed by him, is so diametrically opposed to E m l d  Funk's affidavit that the 
shouid not ,tonsjdgr Warold Funk's ttestirnony as credsble. TIIC ""clarification" portion 
followed a phone conversation between Mr. FLII~C and Mr. T,awrence, and without all of the 
mnomdi)~g cixumstan6;es of that conversation, it is impossible to understad w11a;t iVr. Funk 
was clarifying for Mr. Lawrence with respect to rhc: language. Mr. Lawrence has l m o ~ w ~  bow to 
cantact kfr. Funk since 1998. (Jn fact, plaintiffs counsel was able to locate Mr. Funk based 
upon t l~c address provided by this letter.) If l ~ e  wisl-ted to have testimony regarding this isstlcs, 
he could easily have contacted Mr. Funk. The letter he provides is hearsay, and does not provide 
impeachcat of Mr. Funk's affidavit testimony. Further, Mr. Funk's affidavit testimony is 
corroborated by Mr.Rook7s affidavit testimony. 
Next, TvIr. Lawrence argues that previous affidavits of Funk submitted in unnamed cases 
are inconsistent. However, even if one were to believe the unsupported allegations, tlie affidavtts 
art: not inconsistent. Mr. Funk indicated he sold the property in 1976 and that the same p~ive  
road that had been contjnuously used from when they purchased the property was the one in use 
at that time. In the "other" alleged affidavit, Mr. Funk testified that his family moved to Idaho 
Falls in 1975-1976. Lawrence argues that if Mr. Funk movcd from 1:11e area in 1975, his use of 
the road the last year had to be infrequent at best. This argument misconstrues the affidavit 
testimony. Mr. Funk did not testify that he used the road contii~uously only in 1976. He said the 
road that was the access was the one he had continuously used since he iirst the property, i.e. the 
only road he used, and it: was on an ongoing basis. Lawa-tce confuses "continuous" with 
"frfreqrtent. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RET\;EWEB MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT: 2 
073 
Defenda~ts have submi"rted no material fact in dispte. Summary judment i s  
appropriate. 
D M E D  this &I' day of &w 2007. 
JJWES, VERNON & M E K S ,  P.A. 
BY: 
Attorneys for Plslinliff 
C E R m I C A m  OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the hth day of&- 2007, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
El' U.S. Mail El Oven~gl~t  Nail 
II3 Hand Delivered W TeJ ecop y (FAX) 
John P. WeIan 
2 13 4'"treet 
Coeur d'hlene, JD 8381 6 
REPLY MEMORANDUM TN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR SLWMARY 
JUDGMENT: 3 
C71 
JOHN P a  WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4th Srreet 
Coeur dlAlene, 10 83111 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208)  664-2240 
lSB# 6083 
IN THE 81STRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAt40, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER SUB ASSET INC., a Delaware 
Corporaxion, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
CASE NO. CV-03-04621 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN 
HEARING DATE: June 13, 2007 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
Defendants. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai 1 
I ,  John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 1 
1. 1 am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence, I have personal knowledge of the following facts and could 
competently testify, 
2. This affidavit is  offered in support of the Motion for Disqualification 
for Cause seeking to disqualify the Honorable John T. Mitchell from presiding 
any further in the above-entitled action, and also in support of Defendant;sZ 
application for an order shortening time. 
3 .  When the Honorable John T, Mlrchell took the bench in 2001, your 
affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendant in the case of Yovichin v. 
Bush, CV-2001-2116 (2001). Judge Mitchell took over the role as presiding 
Judge in that case for the Honorable James Judd when Judge Judd retired. Your 
affiant believes that Judge Mitchell disqualified himself, pursuant to Rule 
40(d)(4), in that case on November 20, 2001 because your affiant was the 
attorney of record for the Defendants and Judge Mitchell was biased or prejudice 
against John P. Whelan at that time, as the parties to the action and the counsel 
Tor the Plaintiffs uerty Trunkenholz) had had no prior dealings with Judge 
Mitchell before he was assigned to the case. Your affiant believes that Judge 
Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in the case because he had a "personality 
conflict" with your affiant that biased or prejudiced Judge Mitchell in his 
handling of that case. A copy of the order for disqualification i s  attached hereto 
as Exhibit A. 
4. In the case of Sau/s v. Luchi (CV-04-1616), your affiant was the 
counsel for the Defendant. The matter was tried as a jury trial. The jury 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - Z 
rendered a defense verdict in that chase which the Honorable John T. Mitchell 
overturned in part. The portion of the verdict overturned required your affiant's 
client to pay over an earnest money deposit to the Plaintiffs even though their 
pleadings made no such request. Your affiant believes that the Court's action 
was motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant as the attorney for the 
Defendant in the action. The Defendant filed his own appeal in that action, the 
status of which is  unknown. 
5. In the case of Straub v. Smith, CV-04-5437 (Supreme Court No. 
31955), your affiant was the attorney for the Defendants. In that case, the 
Plaintiff dismissed her action one week before a scheduled jury trial. The 
attorney for the Plaintiff, Scott Poorman, sought and received your affiant's 
stipulation to have the case dismissed. Your affiant reached no agreement with 
Mr. Poorman to waive costs and attorney fees. Yet, the order submitted to the 
Honorable John T, Mitchell by Mr. Poorman contained wording that the parties 
were to bear their own costs. The proposed order was not sent to your affiant 
before being submitted to the Court for signing. The Court signed the order as 
submitted. When the order was served on your affiant after it had been signed, 
your affiant filed a timely motion for reconsideration. The Honorable John T. 
Mitchell did not apparently read the motion. The motion was denied. The 
grounds for denial included the failure to cite a rule of  procedure in support of 
the motion (yet such a rule was referenced in the motion). The claim for costs 
and attorney fees was denied on the additional ground that the Defendants' 
pleading did not contain a request for attorney fees (which 1.R.C.P Rule 54(e)(4) 
specifically states is not necessary). This ground for denial of the motion For 
reconsideration was not even asserted by Mr. Poorman in his opposition papers 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 3 076 
to the motion. The Cour~  supplied Mr. Poorman wirh his argument. Attorney 
fees and cosrs wpre denied to your affiant and his clients even though the Court 
admonished Mr. Poorman for perpetrating a fraud on the Court. An appeal was 
filed by your affiant for the Defendants and the Court of Appeal overturned the 
trial coun's ruling on the matter. The Idaho Supreme Court took the case on 
review but no decision has been issued on the review. Your affiant believes that 
the Court's ruling in the Straub v. Smith case was motivated by the Coun's bias 
and prejudice against your affiant. 
6. In the case of Capsrar v. Lawrence, CV-02-7671 (Supreme Court NO. 
32090), the Honorable John T. Mitchell granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Plaintiff, who was Susan Seeks, the partner of Lee James, a friend of the 
Honorable John T. Mitchell and the current president of the ldaho Trial Lawyers 
Association. In this case, the Court found that a certain Sale Agreement 
pertaining t o  the sale of  land was clear and unambiguous, An appeal was taken 
by the Defendants. The ldaho Supreme Court overturned the grant o f  summary 
judgment. Your affiant believes rhar the result on the appeal has merely 
increased the bias and prejudice of the Court against your affiant. 
7. In the case of T~kver Asset Sub, inc, v. Lawrence, CV-03-462 1 
(Supreme Court No. 320921, on the same set of documents found to be clear 
and unambiguous in the Capsrar case, the Court found the documents 
ambiguous. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in that 
action. Your affiant believes that the granting of summary judgment in favor of 
the Plaintiff (who was represented by Ms. Weeks) was motivated by bias and 
prejudice against your affiant. An appeal was taken to the ldaho Supreme Court 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. W H E U N  - 4 
and the Court's order was overturned. Your affiant believes that the results of 
the appeal in the. case has only inrreasPd the Court's bias and prejudice againsr 
your affiant. 
8. In the recent cases of Krivor v. Rogers (CV-06-6252) and 
Metrapolifan Propefly B Casualty v. M e n  (GV-06-6 3 5 8), where your affiant 
represents the Rogers and the Allens, Defendants in the artians, the Honorable 
John T. Mitchell has seemingly made it clear that the Coun will not enterrain 
argument from your affiant unless the argument i s  supported by cases directly 
on point. Your affiant believes the Court has singled out your affiant for 
treatment thar i s  different from the treatment received by other attorneys 
appearing before rhe Honorable John T. Mitchell. 
9. Your affiant believes that the bias and prejudice held by the Court 
against your affiant results in a situation where your affiant's clients do not 
receive fair and impartial rulings by the Coun, Your affiant believes that the 
bias and prejudice held by the Court against your affiant causes the Court to be 
biased and prejudiced against the clients of your affiant. 
10. Your affiant requests that the Honorable John T. Mitchell disqualify 
himself from further rulings an the above-entitled matter. 
1 1 . Good cause for the granting of Defendants' application for an order 
shortening time exists in that the date of June 13, 2007 has already been 
reserved for the hearing of several motions. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 5 
DATED r h i s ay of June, 2007. 
JOHN P, WHELAN, P.C. 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 5* day of June, 2007. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 6 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ay af J u n e ,  2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true a n d  correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicared below, 
and addressed ta the fallowingi 
Susan P, Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N, Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: US,  Mall, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
1% 'THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE I;IRST JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF TliE 
STATE OF IDAHO 1% AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IiOOTENAl 
1 
MAKK DANIEL Y OVICHIN, 1 
1 
vs. I ORDER OF SELF 
) DISQUALIFICATION 
ROBERT BUSH, 1 
1 - 
The undersigned having dcrermined rhar i~ is appropriate to volunrvily disqualify himself 
IT IS OFtDERED rhar the undersigned is hereby disqualified and this marrer is referred ro 
rhc administrative judge for re-assrgmtnr. . 
Dated this 2 d .ft- dny of November, 2001. 
CERTIFICATE OF M~.@Nc 
I hvruby ccni fy (hut aa rPc 2 / day af No~ember, 2001 n rrvr md conic\ copy ol ihc 
forcgoitlg w:ts n i ~ i l c d ,  postngc prepaid, or smtr by ihtcfofficc nlntl or f3crimilc to: 
ORDER OF Set-F OlSQUALlFlCATlON 
Hon Charles l,losi.~ck 
Ex iiblt 
- a 
JOHN P. WHEMN, P,C, 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur dlAlene, 10 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
l5B# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DlSTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
j. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. I 
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER 
SHORTENING TIME 
HEARING DATE: june 13, 2007 
TINE: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
COMES NOW, the attorney for the above-named Defendants, John P. 
Whelan, and respectfully moves the Court for an order that the time required for 
service o f  the Motion for Disqualification for Cause be shortened so that this 
matter can be heard on the 13th day of June, 2007, at 3:00 o'clock p,m., before 
the Honorable John T. Mitchell. 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TINE - 'I 
This Motian is made for the reasan and upon the grounds thar there i s  no t  
suff icient rime to give statutory notice. Plaintiff will n o t  be disadvantaged in any 
Farhian, and further, it would be in the interest of justice. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that John P. Vdhelan will present oral argument and 
evidence at this hearing. 
DATED this g L b a y  crf.JUne, 2007 
Respectfully Su bmltted, 
doh*. Whelan 
hgc&y f o r  Defendants 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5'bay at.June. 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of rhe foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following. 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon (SI Weeks 
Artorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewoad D r ~ v e  
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, 10 8381 4 
Via. U,S, Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
21 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax; (208) 664-2240 
ISf3#$6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COdlNlY OF KOOTENAI 




CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1 
NOTION FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE 
DOUGLAS P, LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J, LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 1 
HEARING DATE: June  13, 2007 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their attorney of record, John P. whelan, and hereby motions this 
court for an Order for Disqualification for Cause against the Honorable John T, 
Mitchell, presiding judge in the above-enritled action. This morion is  made an 
the ground that Defendants believe the Honorable John T. Mitchell is biased or 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE - 1 
prejudiced against them or t h e ~ r  case in this action. Thrs motion Is made on the 
ground of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule  40(6)(2). 
Defendants request oral argument. 
DATED this &day of June, 2007. 
Respectfu Ily Submitted, 
~bhn\p. Whelan 
for Defendants 
MOTION FOR DlSQUALIFICATlON FOR CAUSE - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on rhe ay of June, 2007, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of rhe faregoing by the methad indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P, Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
d Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
STATE ii." !Cglif; 
60UkT ;ST icC<rEh& 
RLE? 
SUSAN I?. WEEKS 
SAmS,  V E m O N  (4;t, WEEKS, P.A, 
1875 N. Lkevvood Dr.: Ste. 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83 8 1 4 
Telephone: (208) 467-0685 
Facsimile. (208) 664-1 684 
ISB JIC.4255 
Plttorneys for Plaintiff 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FTRST JXJDICIAL DISTRICT OF ?3IE 
STATE OF 1 1 3 ~ ~ 0 ,  IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAX 
Plaintiff, 
TOWER ASSET SUB mC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS 
OF MFIDAVTT OF JOHN MACK 
FILED 513 0107 
Case No. CV 03-4621 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
NOTICE OF HEARING: 
June 13,2007 
T h e :  3:00 p.m. 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Plaintiff and pursuant to Rule 56 (e) and Rule 7 (b)(3)(B), Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby moves to strike portions of the dfidavit of John Mack for the reasons 
enumerated herein. Regarding affidavits submitted in support of summary judgment, Posey v. 
Ford Motor Credit Co., 1 1 1 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005) discussed the requirement rhat 
evidence submitted by affidavit must be admissible to be considered by the court. Therein the 
court noted: 
hfCYI'ION TO STRIKE: 1 
088 
PAGE 821' 84 
Poscy u p c s  that nearly the entire &davit is inabissible because Ir does not 
show that the matters avierrcd to arc based on personal hotvledge. contains 
conclusary assertions, contins inadtnisfible hearsay aiid provides no foundat~on 
for introduction of a~ached exhibits. Poscy's position is well taltel~. 
AEdavits supporting or opposing a summatyjudgment motion must be made on 
personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissibIe ill evidence- 
and rnrtst show affirmatively that the afiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56Ce). These requirements "are not satisfied 
by an a f ihv i t  that is conclusory, based on heaxsay. and not supported by 
personal knowledge." (Cites omitted.) 
The Pose y I>. Ford ltlotor Credit Co. court further noted: 
Eight documents arc attached to thc affidavit. No fotu~dation is provided 
concerning who prepared the documents, several o f  which, on their facc, indicate 
that they wcrc not prepared by Ford bul by the Caldwell dealership. The affidavit 
purports to identify the documents witl~out demonstrat~on of the rcquisitc personal 
knowledge for authentication of the doc~ments pursuant to T.R.E. 901 and 
includcs a r v c n t s  as to the documcnts' legal ckct. none of which is admissible. 
(Cite omitted.) To thc cxtcnt that the documents ate offered to show the truth of 
assertions contained within them. the documcnts arc hearsay for whiclt no l-iearsay 
rule excep&on ltas been estabIished by the Griffitb affidavit. In Stare \L IJi'dl, 140 
Idaho 625-97 P.3d 1 01 4 (Ct. App. 2004). we dcscribcd the foundational 
requirements for application of I.R.E. 803(6), the exception to the hearsay rule for 
business records: 
Rule 803(6), the business record exception to tlic hearsay 
rule, allows admission of a record or report if it was made 
and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity and if it was the regular practice of that business to 
makc the report or record. See Henderson v. S'mirh, 128 
Idaho 444,450, 9 2 5 P.2d 6, 12 (1 996); In !he Interest of 
S.W., 127Idaho 513, 520,903P.2dfQ2. 109(Ct.App. 
1995). These foundational requirements must be shown 
through "the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness." 1,R.E. 803(6). That is, the record must be 
authenticated by someone "wlzo lzas custody of the record 
as a regular part of his or her work or who has supesvisioxl 
of its creation." Hendersolz, 128 Idaho at 450, 9 15 P.2d at 
12. A document is not admissible undcr I.R.E. 803(6) 
unless the person testifyxng has a personal knowledge of 
the record-keeping system used by thc business which 
created the document. Id.; Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 
293,297,900 P.2d 201,205 (Ct.App. 1995). 
MOTION TO STFUE: 2 
Hill, f 40 Idaho at 628,97 P.3d at 1 O 1 7. TI1c mere receipt and 
rdention by a business entlty of a document that was created 
elsewhere does not trmsform the docm~ent into a busmess record 
sf the receiving entity for p ~ ~ ~ o s e s  of X.R,E, 803(6)* Id.; In 
rhc Interest of5 TV, 127 Idaho 513, 520. 903 P.2d 102, 109 
(Ct.Apg. 1995). Cr i f f i t h ' s  affidavit does nnl comply with the 
req~tirements of Rule 803(6) wit11 respect to any OF the records 
attacl~ed to his affidavit. 
Posey al: 483-484 
Mr. Mack indicates in his fidavit 'c11at he 1% owned lnis property since 1992 and has 
used and improved a private access road f-rom the termination of Mellick Road into the Section 
22 property he owns, which surrounds the Plaintiffs property. Mr. Mack claims that he 'Yalces 
issue" with Harold Funk's aEidavit testilnoiiy because in 11669 Mellick Road extended to 
property owned by Mr. Funk in Section 15. Mi. Mack postulates, without foundation or 
evidence to support his supposition that Mr. Funk's property connectcd the private access road 
that he ilow uses to access his property in Section 22. Therefore, that portion of Sohn Mack's 
testimony should be stricken and not considered for the motion for enlargement. F~~rther, if it 
was Defendants' intent to present this evidence as raising a question of fact in opposition to t l ~ e  
motion for summary judgment, it should be stricken and 11ot coltsidercd. 
DATED this 7th day of June, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON 2% WEEKS, P.A.. 
BY: 
Attorneys for PI ainli:ff 
MOTION TO STRIKE: 3 
1 I ~ r e b y  certify that a n  tlie 7T'' day of . lm~r .  2007. I caused to be served a true and co12-ect 
copy of the foregaillg dacumrnt by thc method i~~dicatcd bciow, and addressed to thc following: 
€2 U.S. MaiI 17 Oven~igkt Nail 
61 Hand Delivered d Telecopy (FAX) 
J o b  P. Whelm 
21 3 4'" Street 
Coeus d'iilene, US 838 16 
MOTION TO STRIKE: 4 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4" h~treet 
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 4 
Tefe.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax; (208) 664-2240 
ISBW 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER SUB ASSET INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NO. CV-03-04621 
ORDER SHORTENING TINE 
DOUGLAS PA LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 
BASED upon the Motion for Disquallfication for Cause and Application for 
Order Shortening Time filed herein and for good cause appearing, now, 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that John P. Whelan's Motion for Disqualification 
for Cause Application for Order Shortening Time shall be heard on the 13th 
day of June, 2007 at 3:00 p.m. 
ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 1 
- *b. 
DATED this i .-day of June, 2007. 
ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of June, 2007, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed as indicated below: 
John P. Whelan 
2 1 3 N. 4'h Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Fax to (208) 664-2240 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drlve 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
X Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: 
; 'EOF IDAHO ) 
County of KOOTENAi )S" 
FILED > -(35 - f l  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl 
) 
TOWER ASSET, INC., a Delaware 1 
Corporation ) case NO. CV 2003 4621 
1 
Plain tifs , 1 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
) 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
VS. 
1 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE, 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 1 
) 
Defendants. 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
1 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
I ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
I 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE, 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) 
I. BACKGROUND. 
A. Tower Asset, Inc. v. Lawrence. 
On June 27, 2003, plaintiff Tower Asset, Inc. filed this lawsuit against defendants 
Lawrence, requesting an easement across defendants Lawrences' land so that Tower 
Asset could service antennas on land it leased on top of Blossom Mountain. Tower Asset 
requested a temporary restraining order which was granted on June 24, 2003, ordering 0:'s 
Lawrences not to block Tower Asset's access across Blossom Mountain Road, 
cont~ngent on Tower Asset posting a $3,000.00 bond. Douglas Lawrence filed a pro se 
appearance on December 5 2003, and Brenda Lawrence filed a pro se appearance on 
December 18,2003. 
On August 17, 2004, Tower Asset filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
September 9, 2004, attorney John P. Whelan appeared as counsel for the Lawrences. 
Oral argument on the summary judgment motion was held November 9, 2004. At the 
conclusion of that hearing the Court granted Tower Asset's motion and ordered Tower 
Asset's counsel to prepare an order. Tower Asset did not prepare a proposed order for 
quite some time, but on May 27, 2005, this Court entered an "Order Granting Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Entering Decree of Quiet Title." On July 7, 2005, Lawrences 
timely filed a Notice of Appeal. On January 26, 2007, the ldaho Supreme Court filed its 
decision vacating summary judgment and remanding the matter back to this Court. On 
April 18, 2007, the Remittitur from the ldaho Supreme Court was filed in this case. Two 
days later, on April 20, 2007, this Court noticed this matter for a status conference to be 
held on May 14, 2007. Counsel for both sides appeared, and at the conclusion of that 
hearing, this matter was set for a four day jury trial commencing December 10, 2007. 
That jury trial was given a first priority setting relative to the Capstar case. Also on May 
14, 2007 Tower Asset filed its "Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", and this was 
discussed at the May 14, 2007, status conference. At that May 14, 2007, hearing, Tower 
Asset requested a hearing date for their motion for summary judgment and was given the 
date of June 13, 2007. 
On June 5, 2007, John P. Whelan, attorney for defendants Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence, filed a "Motion for Disqualification for Cause", an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan" 
in support of said motion, and a Notice of Hearing on said motion for June 13, 2007. 
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Since such hearing date did not give plaintiff the required fourteen-day notice (I.R.C.P. 
7(b)(3)(A)) , an Applicat~on for Order Shortening Time was filed. At the June 13, 2007 
hearing, the motion to shorten time was granted. 
B. Capsfar Radio Operafing Company v. Lawrence. 
On November 7, 2002, plaintiff Capstar Radio Operating Company filed this 
lawsuit against defendants Lawrence, requesting an easement across defendants 
Lawrences' land so that Capstar could access the land it owns on top of Blossom 
Mountain, upon which it has a transmission tower. Capstar requested a temporary 
restraining order which was granted on November 7, 2002, ordering Lawrences not to 
block Capstar's access across Blossom Mountain Road, contingent on Capstar posting a 
$1,000.00 bond. A hearing was held on November 15 2002, on the preliminary 
injunction, and Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence appeared pro se. The 
preliminary injunction order was entered on November 21, 2002. On December 2, 2002, 
attorney Ian Smith appeared on behalf of Lawrences. On August 26, 2003, Smith filed 
his motion to withdraw which was rendered moot by the substitution of attorney Sam 
Eisemann filed on September 5, 2003. Even though he is not an attorney, on November 
3, 2003, Douglas Lawrence filed a Notice of Substitution of Counsel for both himself and 
Brenda Lawrence. On December 5,2003, Douglas Lawrence filed a notice appearance 
that he is appearing on behalf of himself only. At a hearing December 11, 2003, Douglas 
Lawrence appeared, as did Brenda Lawrence. The Court cautioned the Lawrences of the 
hazards of appearing without counsel, that they would be held to the same standard as 
an attorney, that Douglas Lawrence could not represent Brenda Lawrence, and required 
Brenda Lawrence file a written pro se appearance if she was going to represent herself. 
Mediation was ordered to be completed no later than February 28, 2004. Brenda 
Lawrence filed her appearance on December 18, 2003. 
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On March 9, 2004, Capstar filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and noticed 
that rnot~on for hearing on April 6, 2004, and on March 31, 2004, Capstar noticed that 
rnot~on for hear~ng on April 14. 2004. Lawrences appeared pro se at the April 14, 2004 
hearlng Part~al summary judgment was granted in favor of Capstar against Lawrences 
on Capstar's express easement theory, and the Court specifically stated Capstar's other 
theories were not to be considered until Lawrences completed their discovery. On April 
16 2004, Capstar filed its Motion for Order of Entry of Final Judgment on the grounds 
that since the Court had found an express easement, the other theories were moot. On 
April 22, 2004, the Lawrences pro se filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's 
Partial Summary Judgment of April 14, 2004, and noticed that matter for hearing on April 
29, 2004. Capstar noticed its Motion for Entry of Final Judgment on April 29, 2004, as 
well. At the conclusion of that hearing, this Court granted Capstar's Motion for Entry of 
Final Judgment, denied Lawrences' Motion for Reconsideration, and counsel for Capstar 
was ordered to prepare an order reflecting those rulings. Capstar's counsel failed to do 
so, The case was inactive for quite some time, and as a result, the Court filed a Notice of 
Proposed Dismissal on January 24, 2005. On February 10, 2005, attorney John P. 
Whelan appeared for the Lawrences. An Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Entering Decree of Quiet Title was finally prepared by Capstar's counsel and was 
signed and entered by the Court on June 7, 2005. On July 7 2005, on behalf of the 
Lawrences, Whelan filed a Notice of Appeal. 
On January 26, 2007, the ldaho Supreme Court filed its decision vacating 
summary judgment and remanding the matter back to this Court. On March 30, 2007, the 
Remittitur from the ldaho Supreme Court was filed in this case. On April 20, 2007, this 
Court noticed this matter for a status conference to be held on May 14, 2007. Counsel for 
both sides appeared, and at the conclusion of that hearing this matter was set for a four- 058 
day court trial commencing December 10, 2007, set with a second priority to the Tbwer 
Asset case Also on May 14, 2007, Tower Asset filed its "Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment' and this was discussed at the May 14, 2007, status conference. At that May 
14 2007 hear~ng, Tower Asset requested a hearing date for their motion for summary 
judgment and was given the date of June 13, 2007. 
On June 5, 2007, John P. Whelan, attorney for defendants Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence, filed a "Motion for Disqualification for Cause", an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan" 
In support of said motion, and a Notice of Hearing on said motion for June 13, 2007. 
Since such hearing date did not give plaintiff the required fourteen-day notice (I.R.C.P. 
7(b)(3)(A)), an Application for Order Shortening Time was filed. At the June 13, 2007 
hearing, the motion to shorten time was granted. 
II. ANALYSIS. 
A. Introduction. 
The filing of Lawrences' Motion for Disqualification for Cause has the effect of pre- 
empting the June 13, 2007, hearing on Tower Asset's Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment. That is because "Upon the filing of a motion for disqualification, the presiding 
judge shall be without authority to act further in such action except to grant or deny such 
motion for disqualification." I .R.C.P. 40(d)(5). 
ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(2) requires the "...judge.. .sought to be 
disqualified shall grant or deny the motion for disqualification upon notice and hearing in 
the manner prescribed by these rules for motions." Hearing was held on June 13, 2007. 
This Court appreciates the fact that this is a matter committed to the Court's discretion. 
Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 ldaho 27, 29-30, 81 3 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Ct.App. 1991); 
Roselle v. Heirs and Devisees ofArchie Grover, 117 ldaho 530, 533, 789 P.2d 526, 529 
B. Allegations of Bias and Prejudice Based Upon Past Decisions. 
The basis of Whelan's motion is stated in paragraph nine of his affidavit: 
9. Your affiant believes that the bias and prejudice held by the Court 
against your affiant results in a situation where your affiant's clients do not 
receive fair and impartial rulings by the Court. Your affiant believes that the 
bias and prejudice held by the Court against your affiant causes the Court 
to be biased and prejudiced against the clients of your affiant. 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 5, 9. A review of Whelan's affidavit shows he has made 
specific allegations of "bias and prejudice" by this Court against Whelan, and those 
concerns must be addressed. 
From a temporal standpoint, Mr. Whelan's first concern is stated as follows: 
3. When the Honorable John T. Mitchell took the bench in 2001, 
your affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendant in the case of 
Yovichin v. Bush, CV-2001-2116 (2001). Judge Mitchell took over the role 
as presiding judge in that case for the Honorable James Judd when Judge 
Judd retired. Your affiant believes that judge Mitchell disqualified himself, 
pursuant to Rule 40(d)(4), in that case on November 20, 2001 because your 
affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendants and judge Mitchell was 
biased or prejudice [sic] against John P. Whelan at that time, as the parties 
to the action and the counsel for the Plaintiffs (Jerry Trunkenholz [sic]) had 
had no prior dealings with judge Mitchell before he was assigned to the 
case. Your affiant believes that judge Mitchell voluntarily disqualified 
himself in the case because he had a "personality conflict" with your affiant 
that biased or prejudiced judge Mitchell in his handling of that case. A copy 
of the order for disqualification is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
This Court has reviewed Exhibit A, the Order on Self Disqualification in Yovichin v. Bush. 
From a review of that document, the Court has absolutely no independent recollection as 
to why the Court voluntarily disqualified himself from Yovichin v. Bush, Kootenai County 
Case No. CV 2001 21 16. The Order on Self Disqualification was entered November 20, 
2001, which was the first day of work for the undersigned as a district judge. The court 
file in Yovichin has been purged. The Court has reviewed what was scanned into court 
records in that case. Following that review, the Court cannot determine the reason for the 
disqualification and can only speculate as to two possible reasons. 
First, in Yovichin, John Beutler and Associates, Inc., and Rafael (Rusty) Reyes "^o , LJ 
were eventually brought in as third party defendants by defendant Bush. However, from a 
revlew of the l~mited court records it appears that this did not occur until after November 
20, 2001 The undersigned would consider Mr. Reyes and Mr. Beutler as friends and 
would likely not have felt comfortable being assigned to a case where they were parties or 
potentla! witnesses. Since the scanned file is incomplete, it is not clear is whether the 
Court's review of the file on November 20, 2001, would have disclosed that John Beutler 
or Rusty Reyes were involved in the case. 
The second and more likely reason the undersigned disqualified himself in 
Yovichin is as follows: As an attorney, the undersigned can recall being involved in only 
one lawsuit where Mr. Whelan was the opposing attorney. That case was In the Matter of 
the Estate of Dianne Rothe, Kootenai County Case No. SP 675. That case involved a 
probate filed by Mr. Whelan on behalf of his client Alvin V. "Butch" Rothe. A review of the 
court file in that case shows that at the time the undersigned was transitioning from an 
attorney to a judge, he was still counsel for the ldaho Trial Lawyer's Association, which 
had been named as a recipient of a foundation named after the decedent's predeceased 
husband, to be funded from a medical malpractice claim that allegedly resulted in his 
death. The undersigned became involved in that case on March 22, 2000, and remained 
involved until just before his investiture as a district judge. On November 16, 2001, four 
days before becoming district judge, the undersigned signed a Notice of Substitution of 
Counsel where Leander L. James was substituted as counsel for the ldaho Trial Lawyer's 
Association. Since In the Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rothe was still pending at the 
time of the undersigned's appointment as a district judge, the undersigned would have 
disqualified himself from Yovichin as a matter of course. Upon inheriting Judge Judd's 
caseload on November 20, 2001, the undersigned disqualified himself from those case* 101 
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ass~yned to Judge Judd in which cwnsel on those cases were the opposing counsel in 
cases in which the undersigned was involved as an adversarial opponent at the time of 
the undersigned's appointment. Self disqualifications in those cases were made to avoid 
any appearance of bias since just prior to November 21,2001, the undersigned and one 
of the counsel in those cases assigned to the undersigned judge were in an adversarial 
relationship. Those self-disqualifications were only made to cases in which counsel were 
involved who were opposing adversarial counsel in other cases that were still pending 
which the undersigned was an attorney at the time he became district judge. Those self- 
disqualifications were made in several cases in an effort to avoid the appearance of 
impropriety that would occur when one day the undersigned was your adversarial 
opponent in a litigated case, and the next day he was assigned to be the judge in another 
one of your cases. The passage of time ameliorated that concern. 
Again, since the undersigned has no independent recollection as to why he 
disqualified himself in Yovichin, all of the above amounts to conjecture. Mr. Whelan has 
not stated any reason why he feels this Court would have had a "personality conflict" with 
Mr. Whelan back on November 21, 2001, so this Court can only speculate. The only 
reason this Court engages in such speculation is because Mr. Whelan has raised 
concerns and those concerns must be addressed. The undersigned cannot recall why he 
disqualified himself in Yovichin v. Bush. In spite of the Court's best efforts to determine 
the reason for the 2001 disqualification in Yovichin v. Bush, the fact that the Court cannot 
recall the reason itself indicates a lack of bias or prejudice. Had bias or prejudice or a 
"personality conflict" been the reason for that disqualification in 2001, the Court would 
expect to remember that. It does not. 
The undersigned can unequivocally state that he harbors no grudges against Mr. 
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Whelan at the present, nor did he on Novernber 21, 2001. The undersigned can 
unequivocally state that he has no bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan at present, nor 
did he on November 21,2001 
If the reason for that self-disqualification in Yovichin v. Bush was due to the still 
pencJing probate or trust litigation, the passage of time eliminates the need to self- 
disqualify or disqualify for cause due to past adversarial relationships. Within the 
passage of a year, the undersigned did not disqualify himself from new cases assigned to 
him, in which counsel were involved which were involved in litigation still pending at the 
time he became a district judge. That fact is borne out by the fact that apparently the next 
time a case in which Mr. Whelan was involved was assigned to the undersigned was in 
2004 in Sauls v. Luchi, Kootenai County Case No. CV 2004 161 6. That case was filed 
March 8, 2004, twenty eight months after the undersigned was appointed as a district 
judge, and at least twenty-eight months distant from any prior dealings with Mr. Whelan 
as an adversary. Accordingly, there was no self-disqualification in Sauls v. Luchi. 
Mr. Whelan's next concern is as follows: 
4. In the case of Sauls v. Luchi (CV-04-1616), your affiant was the counsel 
for the Defendant. The matter was tried as a jury trial. The jury rendered a 
defense verdict in that chase [sic] which the Honorable John T. Mitchell 
overturned in part. The portion of the verdict overturned required your 
affiant's client to pay over an earnest money deposit to the Plaintiffs even 
though their pleadings made no such request. Your affiant believes that the 
Court's action was motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant as the 
attorney for the Defendant in the action. The Defendant filed his own 
appeal in that action, the status of which is unknown. 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, pp. 2-3, 4. This Court's action in that case was simply not 
in any way "motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant as the attorney for the 
Defendant in the action." Mr. Whelan is correct; Mr. Luchi filed his own appeal. A review 
of the Court file in Sauls v. Luchi, which is entirely intact, would have shown Mr. Whelan 
that on November 8, 2006, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the undersigned in all 
respects in 2006 unpublished Opinion No. 71 5. That decision became final upon April 
"i3 2007, with the filing of the Remittitur in that case. In any event, the decisions made by 
the Court in Sauls v. Luchi were not made based upon bias or prejudice against Mr 
Whelan. They were decisions based upon motions made by opposing counsel Charles 
Dean. The Court has reviewed its June 17,2005 "Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict" in Sauls v. Luchi. It is well 
reasoned. While Luchi filed his own appeal, if Mr. Whelan felt the judge was biased or 
prejudiced, or off base in its decision, or misunderstood the matter before it, there are 
mechanisms short of appeal Mr. Whelan could have used to bring that error to the Court's 
attention. That did not occur. In any contested motion, usually one side wins, one side 
loses. Sometimes one party wins in part and loses in part. Just because one side wins 
does not mean the judge's decision was based upon bias or prejudice against the party 
who lost or their attorney. The undersigned knows such was not the case in Sauls v. 
Luchi. 
Next, Mr. Whelan writes in his affidavit; 
5. In the case of Straub v. Smith, CV-04-5437 (Supreme Court No. 
31 955), your affiant was the attorney for the Defendants. In that case, the 
Plaintiff dismissed her action one week before a scheduled jury trial. The 
attorney for the Plaintiff, Scott Poorman, sought and received your affiant's 
stipulation to have the case dismissed. Your affiant reached no agreement 
with Mr. Poorman to waive costs and attorney fees. Yet, the order 
submitted to the Honorable John T. Mitchell by Mr. Poorman contained 
wording that the parties were to bear their own costs. The proposed order 
was not sent to your affiant before being submitted to the Court for signing. 
The Court signed the order as submitted. When the order was served on 
your affiant after it had been signed, your affiant filed a timely motion for 
reconsideration. The Honorable John T. Mitchell did not apparently read 
the motion. The motion was denied. The grounds for denial included the 
failure to cite a rule of procedure in support of the motion (yet such a rule 
was referenced in the motion). The claim for costs and attorney fees was 
denied on the additional ground that the Defendants' pleading did not 
contain a request for attorney fees (which 1.R.C.P Rule 54(e)(4) specifically 
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states IS not necessary). This ground for denial of the motion for 
reconsideration was not even assefied by Mr. Poorrnan in his opposition 
papers to the motion. The Court supplied Mr. Poorman with his argument. 
Attorney fees and costs were denied to your affiant and his clients even 
though the Court admonished Mr. Poorman for perpetrating a fraud on the 
Court. An appeal was filed by your affiant for the Defendants and the Court 
of Appeal overturned the trial court's ruling on the matter. The ldaho 
Supreme Court took the case on review but no decision has been issued on 
the review. Your afiant believes that the Court's ruling in the Straub v. 
Smith case was motivated by the Court's bias and prejudice against your 
affiant. 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, pp. 3-4, 5. The rulings against Mr. Whelan's client in 
Straub v. Smith were simply not motivated in any way by bias or prejudice on behalf of 
this Court. The Court has reviewed the intact Court file in Straub v. Smith and is 
convinced of that fact. Mr. Whelan's affidavit raises several issues. Since Straub v. 
Smith is still under consideration by the ldaho Supreme Court, it would be inappropriate 
for this Court to comment on the merits of anything that occurred in that case. 
Mr. Whelan claims: "The Honorable John T. Mitchell did not apparently read the 
motion [to reconsider]." Id. A review of the court file in Straub v. Smith shows that a 
hearing was held on May 10, 2005, on Smith's (Mr. Whelan's client) Motion to 
Reconsider. At that hearing, a review of the court minutes show that not only did this 
Court indicate on the record that it had reviewed the Motion to Consider, but articulated 
the grounds Mr. Whelan set forth in that motion. The Court mentioned Jones v. Berezay, 
120 ldaho 332, 81 5 P.2d 1072 (1 991) as a case on point, a case neither attorney in 
Straub cited to the Court. So not only did the Court read Mr. Whelan's motion to 
reconsider, since Mr. Whelan's motion contained no citations to any legal authority, the 
Court conducted its own research. 
The bottom line is that in Straub v. Smith, Mr. Whelan did what he should have 
done if he andlor his client disagreed with this Court's rulings. ..they filed a request for 1 0 5  
reconsideration and then an appeal. 
A request for reconsideration is exactly what the Lawrences did in Capstar v. 
Lawrence, CV 2002 7671, and an appeal is exactly what Mr. Whelan and his clients have 
done in Capstar and Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 462 1. An appeal is 
the appropriate action to take if you believe a judge has committed error, made a mistake, 
or misunderstood the facts or the law. The rulings made against Mr. Whelan's client in 
Capstar and Tower Asset were not in any way made or motivated by bias or prejudice 
against Mr. Whelan by this Court. In fact, this Court's ruling in the Capstar case was 
made before Mr. Whelan even appeared in that case. The ruling was made in Capstar 
while the Lawrences were proceeding pro se. For the same reasons set forth above in 
Straub v. Smith, it would be inappropriate for this Court to discuss the merits of these two 
cases. 
Mr. Whelan claims bias or prejudice on behalf of the Court because counsel for 
plaintiffs in Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 
CV 2003 4621 "...Susan Seeks [sic], the partner of Lee James, a friend of the Honorable 
John T. Mitchell and the current president of the ldaho Trial Lawyers Association." 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 4, 6. It is true that plaintiffs' counsel in Capstar and 
7*0werAsset, Susan Weeks, is in the same law firm as Lee James. However, the 
undersigned has no knowledge as to whether they are partners or what their professional 
relationship is. It is true that Lee James is president of the ldaho Trial Lawyers 
Association, but the undersigned was unaware of that fact until the undersigned read Mr 
Whelan's affidavit and confirmed the fact by viewing the ITLA website. Mr. Whelan has 
not made clear what Mr. James being president of ITLA has to do with anything. The 
undersigned was a member of the ITLA five and one half years ago, but is not a member 
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now that he is a district judge. The undersigned was the attorney of record for I T M  in the 
case In the Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rathe, but the undersigned received no 
financial remuneration for all time spent on that case. That matter was handled pro bono 
during the undersigned's involvement. In the general sense of the word, the undersigned 
is a "friend'of Lee James, but has not seen Lee James in other than a professional 
setting in more than fourteen months. The last time the undersigned saw Lee James 
socially was at a fund raising event for ICARE, a child abuse prevention agency. Lee 
James may have appeared in court before the undersigned in the past fourteen months 
as an attorney in a hearing, but the undersigned has no recollection of that one way or 
another. The Court is confident it has not spoken to Lee James or seen Lee James 
socially since the ICARE fund raising event. Along with Peter Erbland, Lee James helped 
organize a fund raising event for the undersigned in his re-election, but that occurred 
about fifteen months ago. The fund raising event was held at Mr. Erbland's law firm and 
other than that fact, the undersigned is not aware of what efforts Mr. James expended on 
that fund raising event. 
Mr. Whelan then makes the claim that: 
8. In the recent cases of Krivor v. Rogers (CV-06-6252) and 
Metropolitan Property & Casualty v. Allen (CV-06-6358), where your affiant 
represents the Rogers and the Allens, Defendants in the actions, the 
Honorable John T. Mitchell has seemingly made it clear that the Court will 
not entertain argument from your affiant unless the argument is supported 
by cases directly on point. Your affiant believes the Court has singled out 
your affiant for treatment that is different from the treatment received by 
other attorneys appearing before the Honorable John T. Mitchell. 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 5, 85. The claim that "the Honorable John T. Mitchell 
has seemingly made it clear that the Court will not entertain argument from your affiant 
unless the argument is supported by cases directly on point", without more, is a difficult 
claim in which to form a response. Since those are pending cases, it is improper to 
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respond to the merits of any legal arguments raised in those cases by Mr. Whelan. First 
of all, it should go without saying that argument supported by cases directly on point will 
be more persuasive than an argument lacking that support. Second, the allegation by Mr. 
Whelan that "...the Honorable John T. Mitchell has seemingly made it clear that the Court 
will not entertain argument from your affiant unless the argument is supported by cases 
directly on point" lacks specificity as to any particular ruling made at a particular hearing. 
A review of the court minutes on all hearings held in Krivor and Metropolitan show that at 
no time was Mr. Whelan not allowed to present argument, nor was he cut off on any 
argument, nor was he told that without cases on point his arguments would not be 
entertained. In Krivor Mr. Whelan did not attend the January 30, 2007 hearing; Mr. 
Whelan did not attend the February 20, 2007, hearing; Mr. Whelan attended the April 26, 
2007, hearing and argued without interruption; Mr. Whelan did not attend the May 23, 
2007, hearing. In Metropolitan: Mr. Whelan did not appear at the December 19, 2006 
scheduling conference, he had on November 8,2006 faxed the Court in chambers a copy 
of a Notice of Appearance, but no filing fee was paid so the pleading was not filed; 
Mr.Whelan attended the March 22, 2007 hearing and argued without interruption; Mr. 
Whelan attended the April 24, 2007 hearing and argued without interruption. If the Court 
in Krivor and Metropolitan failed to entertain an argument by Mr. Whelan, one would 
expect a motion for reconsideration. A review of the court files in Krivor v. Rogers (CV- 
06-6252) and Metropolitan Property & Casualty v. Allen (CV-06-6358) reveals no motions 
for reconsideration filed by Mr. Whelan on behalf of his clients therein. 
A review of the court files in the following cases show no motion for disqualification 
for cause (I .R.C. P.  40(d)(2)) has ever been filed: Krivor v. Rogers (CV-06-6252), 
Metropolitan Property & Casualty v. Allen (CV-06-6358), Straub v. Smith, (CV-04-5437), 
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S a ~ ~ l s  v L U C ~ I  (CV-04-1616). Whlle that fact has little, if anylhing, to do with this Court 
not belng biased or prejudiced against Mr. Whelan, if Mr. Whelan's feeling that this Court 
was b~ased or prejudiced against him goes back to November 21, 2001, one would have 
expected a motion for disqualification to have been made in one of these cases at an 
earlier time. On November 15, 2006, a motion to disqualify without cause (I.R.C.P. 
40(d)(l)) was made by Mr. Whelan on behalf of his client in Krivor v. Rogers, and that 
motion was granted on November 16, 2006. Following objection from opposing counsel 
as to the issue of service, that order was rescinded by an order dated November 20, 
2006. If there were concerns as to bias or prejudice of this Court, a motion for 
disqualification for cause would certainly have been anticipated in that case at that time. 
Decisions from the ldaho Supreme Court were issued on January 26, 2007, in 
Tower Asset Sub Inc., v. Lawrence and Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence. 
Mr. Whelan states that regarding those two cases an appeal was taken by the 
defendants, that the ldaho Supreme Court overturned the grant of summary judgment, 
then notes "Your affiant believes that the result on the appeal has merely increased the 
bias and prejudice of the Court against your affiant." Affidavit of John P. Whelan, pp 4-5, 
r[r[ 6, 7. The Court has read the decisions in both cases and finds them to be well written. 
As noted by the ldaho Supreme Court, this Court committed error, and the ldaho 
Supreme Court reversed that error. Those appellate decisions are the "law of the case" in 
these two cases. This Court is human. It is quite a different thing to argue that because 
this Court committed error, which the ldaho Supreme Court corrected, that this Court 
would then hold against Mr. Whelan the fact he prevailed on behalf of his clients on those 
appeals. Quite the contrary. Mr. Whelan is to be commended for bringing those appeals 
and having the ldaho Supreme Court correct the mistake. He did the right thing. "The 
1'39 results of the appeal" (Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 5, r[ 7), create no bias or prejudice 
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aga~nst Mr. Whelan whatsoever The Idaho Court of Appeals held in Desfosses v. 
Desfssses, 120 ldaho 27, 30, 813 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct.App. 1991), "A disqualifying 
prejud~ce cannot be deduced from adverse rulings by a judge, whether they are right or 
wrong." Citing 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges 5 221 (1969). Adverse rulings alone do not support 
the existence of a disqualifying prejudice. Bell v. Bell, 122 ldaho 520, 835 P.2d 1331 
(Ct.App. 1992). "Merely because a judge has participated in prior legal proceedings 
involving related parties or issues does not provide grounds for the judge to recuse 
himself." Roselle v. Heirs and Devisees of  Archie Grover, 1 1 7 ldaho 530, 534, 789 P.2d 
526, 530 (Ct.App. 1990). 
At oral argument on June 13, 2007, Mr. Whelan mentioned that in Capstarthe 
Court found the language in the deed to be unambiguous, and the language in the same 
deed to be ambiguous in TowerAsset. Certainly that was a mistake by this Court, and 
that mistake was pointed out by the ldaho Supreme Court in TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. 
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 5, n. 2 (January 26, 2006). However, that mistake by 
this Court does not indicate bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan. To the extent the 
mistake needs to be explained to address any concerns of Mr. Whelan, it is explained as 
follows: On April 14, 2004, this Court heard argument on plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment in Capstar, and Lawrences' argument was presented by Douglas Lawrence, pro 
se. In granting summary judgment, the Court found the language of the deed and sales 
agreement unambiguous. The Lawrences pro se made a motion to reconsider in Capstar, 
and at hearing on that motion on April 29, 2004, this Court again stated the deed was 
unambiguous. The Tower Asset motion for summary judgment was heard seven months 
laferon November 9, 2004, and argument was presented by Mr. Whelan. While the 
finding of ambiguitylunambiguity is inconsistent, the Court was faced with two different 
arguments by two different people, one a lawyer and one not, on two difierent days seven 
months apart. The ambiguouslunambiguous nature of the deed and sales agreement 
was not the basis for the reversal in these cases by the ldaho Supreme Court. The ldaho 
Supreme Court found that neither the deed nor the sales agreement created an express 
easement. TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, pp. 6-7 (January 
26, 2006); Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 13, p. 4 
(January 26, 2006). Thus, even if there were some logic to the argument that the Court 
was biased or prejudiced because the Court found the documents ambiguous in the case 
Mr. Whelan argued and unambiguous in the case Douglas Lawrence argued seven 
months earlier, that specific ruling was not relevant. What is relevant as far as any bias or 
prejudice by the Court is the fact that in both cases, one argued pro se by Douglas 
Lawrence and one argued by Mr. Whelan, the result was the same. There is no 
differential treatment by this Court as between Mr. Whelan or Douglas Lawrence. 
At oral argument on June 13, 2007, Mr. Whelan mentioned several issues he had 
not mentioned in his "Motion for Disqualification for Cause" or his "Affidavit of John P. 
Whelan". First, Mr. Whelan mentioned that he had won jury trials and court trials before 
the undersigned. At oral argument Mr. Whelan stated he had "...a string of motions that 
had not been granted by the Court." Not every attorney wins every motion, and not every 
attorney wins half of the motions they bring or defend. Mr.Whelanls affidavit mentions 
Sauls v. Luchi (one motion), Straub v. Smith (one motion and a motion to reconsider that 
motion) and now Capstar v. Lawrence (one motion but as previously mentioned, Mr. 
Whelan was not counsel for Lawrences when Capstarwas decided) and TowerAsset 
Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence (one motion). Even if it were proper to base a claim of bias or 
prejudice upon past adverse rulings (Desfosses and Bell show it is not proper), four 
rnot~ons is hardly a sign~ficantly large statistical sample upon which to base a clairn of bias 
or prejudice resting upon prior decisions rendered. And if keeping score were proper (it is 
not), one would think you would weigh those motions against the court trials Mr. Whelan 
indicated he had won which were assigned to this Court. 
At oral argument Mr. Whelan for the first time raised the case of Whelan v. Mills, a 
fee dispute between Mr. Whelan and a client that was assigned to this Court, as another 
example of how this Court exhibited bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan. Mr. Whelan 
did not have a case number, but the Court researched the matter and reviewed the court 
file in Kootenai County Case No. CV 2003 3582. In Whelan v. Mills Mr. Whelan in his 
complaint alleged the Mills owed him $1 1,903.74. In their answer the Mills claimed Mr. 
Whelan owed the Mills $4,085.00 for work they had done for Mr. Whelan. After a May 
24, 2004, court trial before the undersigned, this Court found the Mills owed Mr. Whelan 
$6,453.89. Part of the reason Mr. Whelan was found to not be entitled to all he was 
claiming was he had unilaterally raised his hourly rate from $125.00 to $1 50.00 per hour. 
The remaining reason Mr. Whelan was found to not be entitled to all he claimed was 
Greg Mills was entitled a credit for work he had performed on Mr. Whelan's land. 
However, instead of the $4.085.00 credit the Mills were seeking, the Court found them 
only entitled to $1,290.00. It is difficult to see how this Court's ruling in that case amounts 
to bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan. 
Finally, while the following argument has not been made by Mr Whelan, it needs to 
be addressed. It could be argued that simply because Mr. Whelan has made this motion 
to disqualify, and his affidavit contains many allegations of bias and prejudice against the 
undersigned, such allegations of bias or prejudice alone would now render the Court 
biased and prejudiced. There have been other motions to disqualify the undersigned for 
cause in the past, and there will be similar motions in the future. While such motions are 1 7 2 
infrequent, the unders~gned is duty bound to take the claims very seriously. The 
undersigned has given careful attention to the claims of bias and prejudice and can 
assure the parties and their attorneys, especially Mr. Whelan, that no bias or prejudice is 
present merely because this motion has been made. Mr. Whelan has concerns. Mr. 
Whelan is commended for bringing those concerns to the Court's attention. It is 
unfortunate that Mr. Whelan did not raise these concerns earlier as he has apparently 
harbored them for at least a couple of years since Sauls v.luchi was decided. But Mr. 
Whelan has come forth and raised his concerns at this time in this motion to disqualify for 
cause in this case. He has that right. Indeed, if he is sincere in those concerns, and 
there is no reason to believe he is not sincere in those beliefs, then he has a duty to 
consult with his client, and if his client consents, to raise those concerns with the Court. 
The filing of this motion to disqualify for cause does not in any way result in bias or 
prejudice by the Court. The Court is neither insulted nor inconvenienced in any way by 
the filing of the motion. Mr. Whelan has concerns and the Court must address those 
concerns. The reason for the length of this written opinion is to address those concerns. 
The affidavit of Mr. Whelan uses terms such as: "Your affiant believes that Judge 
Mitchell disqualified himself.. . because.. . Judge Mitchell was biased or prejudice [sic] 
against John P. Whelan at that time" (Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 2, 7 3); "Your 
affiant believes that judge Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in the case because he 
had a 'personality conflict' with your affiant ..." (Id.); "Your affiant believes that the Court's 
action was motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant.. ."  (Id. p. 3, 74); "The 
Honorable John T. Mitchell did not apparently read the motion" (Id. p. 3, 7 5); "Your 
affiant believes that the Court's ruling in the Staub v. Smith case was motivated by the 
Court's bias and prejudice against your affiant" (Id. p. 4, 7 5); and "Your affiant believes 
the Court has s~ngled out your af-fiant for treatment that is different from the treatment 
received by other attorneys appearing before the Honorable John T. Mitchell" Id. p. 5, 7 8. 
As stated by the ldaho Court of Appeals upholding a denial of a motion for disqualification 
for cause by a judge: "Suspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, conjecture, 
innuendo, and statements of mere conclusions.. . may not be substituted for a statement 
of facts." Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 ldaho 27, 30, 813 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct.App. 1991), 
citing Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287, 295 (1 952). While Mr. Whelan's 
concerns are not "facts", making this motion to disqualify for cause is about the only way 
he could air these concerns he has. Mr. Whelan's concerns are unfounded. That is not 
to say Mr. Whelan is not sincere when he says he has those feelings. But it is to say that 
this Court simply does not harbor the bias and prejudice alleged by Mr. Whelan. The 
undersigned is not biased or prejudiced against Mr. Whelan or against his present clients 
in this case, or his past clients in past cases. 
C. Campaign Contributions by Opposing Counsel's Firm. 
Mr. Whelan raised the issue of campaign contributions for the first time at oral 
argument on June 13, 2007. Mr. Whelan made an offer of proof that the firm of which 
Susan Weeks is a partner contributed $1,000 to the undersigned's re-election fund in the 
spring of 2006, according to the Sunshine Disclosure filed with the State of ldaho 
Secretary of State. At oral argument, Mr. Whelan also mentioned that attorney Scott 
Poorman, the attorney opposing Mr. Whelan in Straub v. Smith, supra, donated to the 
undersigned's re-election fund in the spring of 2006. The problem with the argument 
regarding Mr. Poorman is that the last action taken by this Court in Sfraub v. Smith 
occurred on May 10, 2005 (a year before the election and Mr. Poorman's contribution), 
when this Court signed the Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
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There cannot even be the appearance of a quid pro quo when the predicate contribution 
has not even yet occurred. 
As to the contribution to the undersigned's re-election fund by Ms. Week's firm, 
there was no evidence that Ms. Weeks made the contribution or that she consented to 
the contribution, or even that there is a partnership. If the Court were to assume that she 
consented and that her firm is a partnership, there still is no basis for the Court to 
disqualify himself. 
First of all, had the offer of proof not been made by Mr. Whelan at the hearing on 
June 13, 2007, the undersigned would still to this day be ignorant of what is contained in 
the Sunshine Report regarding Ms. Weeks' law firm. The Court disclosed on the record 
at the June 13, 2007, hearing the fact that it had not reviewed the Sunshine Report, but 
assumed it was accurate as the Court trusts his campaign treasurer who filed the report. 
The reason the Court has not reviewed the financial disclosure report is the Court must 
abide by the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct. Cannon 5(C)(2) states in part: "Except as 
required by law, a candidate's judicial election committee should not disclose the names 
of contributors to judicial campaigns and judicial candidates and judges should avoid 
obtaining the names of contributors to the judicial campaign." Since the Court was at all 
times ignorant of this financial contribution, the Court could not and was not biased or 
prejudiced in favor of Ms. Weeks. Likewise, the Court was not biased or prejudiced 
against Mr. Whelan as a result of a contribution made by Ms. Weeks' firm, of which it 
was, up to June 13, 2007, ignorant. 
Now the Court has been made aware of that fact by Mr. Whelan, the Court must 
now make two determinations. First, does the knowledge of Ms. Weeks' firm's 
contribution result in any bias or prejudice in her favor? Second, is this now a 
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"proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned", which 
i 1s 
includes but 1s not l~m~ted to instances "where the judge has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party or a party's lawyer " Cannon 3(E)(l)(a). Campaign contributions of 
which a judge has knowledge, made by lawyers or other who appear before the judge, 
may be relevant to disqualification." Comment to Cannon 5(C)(2). 
This Court can honestly say that the contribution by Ms. Weeks' firm in no way 
results in any bias or prejudice in her favor. There are several reasons for this. First, 
there is more than one attorney in Ms. Weeks' firm. The firm's phone book ad lists three 
attorneys. It is unknown who made the decision to contribute. Second is the amount of 
the contribution. A candidate's committee may only solicit and accept reasonable 
contributions from lawyers. Cannon 5(C)(2). One thousand dollars is a reasonable 
amount from a firm of lawyers. According to Mr. Whelan's own offer of proof, other firms 
donated similar amounts or more. Third, since the undersigned was ignorant of the 
contribution until Mr. Whelan's offer of proof, obviously no one within the firm expected or 
asked for any preferential treatment as a result of the contribution. 
No cases were cited by Mr. Whelan on this issue at the June 13, 2007 hearing. 
Since the issue was raised by Mr. Whelan for the first time at hearing, Ms. Weeks cited 
no cases. Campaign contributions cannot serve as independent grounds for recusal. 
Degarmo v. State, 922 S. W.2d 256, 267 (Tex.App. 1996), citing River Road 
Neighborhood Association v. South Texas Sports, Inc. 673 S.W.2d 952, 953 (Tex.App. 
1984). In that case, the judge was found not to have abused his discretion when he 
accepted a $500 campaign contribution from a murder victim's family. Id. In Rocha v. 
Ahmad, 662 S. W.2d 77 (Tex.App. 1983), the Court of Appeals of Texas unanimously 
held that one of its members should not be disqualified even though two of the justices 
had received "...many thousands of dollars from or though the Law Office of Pat 
Maloney, P C (attorney for the appellees)". Id. In River Road Neighborhood Associat~on 
673 $3 W 2d 952 (Tex App 1984). ~t was held that two justices on the Texas Court of 
Appeals, one who had received 21.7% of h ~ s  total reported campaign contr~butions, and 
another justice who had received 17.1% of his total reported campaign contributions from 
South Texas Sports, a party to the litigation, were not disqualified because neither of the 
" challenged Justices may gain or lose anything of a pecuniary or personal nature 
because of any judgment that might be rendered in this case." The $1 000 contribution 
from Ms. Weeks' firm is significantly less than 17.1 % of all amounts contributed to the 
undersigned's campaign, as the undersigned himself spent $12,000.00 of his own funds 
on such campaign, and the undersigned is aware that over $50,000 was spent on the 
campaign (thus assumes about $38,000 was raised from other people). There is no 
contention made, nor is there any way possible the undersigned could gain or lose from 
any future rulings in either the Capstar or the Tower Asset case. 
In MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store and MackKenzie v. Breakstone, 565 
So.2d 1332 (Fla. 1990), the Supreme Court of Florida held that an allegation in a motion 
for disqualification "...that a litigant or counsel for a litigant has made a legal campaign 
contribution to the campaign of the trial judge, or the political campaign of the trial judge 
or the trial judge's spouse (two consolidated cases on appeal) without more, is not a 
legally sufficient ground" for disqualification. 565 So.2d at 1334. The Florida Supreme 
Court noted: "As with other campaigns, judicial campaigns require funds." 565 So.2d at 
1335. "Judicial campaigns and the resultant contributions to those campaigns, therefore 
are necessary components to our judicial system." Id. The Florida Supreme Court noted 
that ". . .the United States Supreme Court has raised two concerns raised by contributions 
to campaigns for public office: 'I. The tendency or possibility to create a quid pro quo 
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relationship and, 2. The creation of an appearance of influence or corruption."' Id. The 
Florida Supreme Court then held: 
However, we find that Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct together with 
Florida's statutory limitation upon campaign contributions and the requisite 
public disclosure of such contributions, provide adequate safeguards 
against the above-entitled concerns regarding contributions to 
constitutionally mandated judicial campaigns and render the ground alleged 
in the motions at bar legally insufficient when presented as the sole ground 
for disqualification. 
565 So.2d at 1336. There are thus, three factors. First, the applicable Florida Judicial 
Conduct provision was that judicial candidates "should not himself solicit campaign funds, 
or solicit attorneys forpublicly stated support, but he may establish committees of 
responsible person to secure and manage the expenditure of funds.. . "  Id. (emphasis in 
original). ldaho has essentially identical language: "A candidate shall not solicit 
campaign contributions in person." Canon 5(C)(2). "A candidate may establish 
committees of responsible person to conduct campaigns for the candidate through media 
advertisements, brochures, mailings, candidate forums and other means not prohibited by 
law. Such committees may solicit and accept reasonable campaign contributions, 
manage the expenditure of funds ..." Id. Second, the per person campaign contribution 
limit in Florida for a district judge in 1990 was $2,000. 565 So.2d at 1336. In ldaho that 
amount at present is $1,000. ldaho Code § 67-6610A. Third, Florida statute requires 
disclosure by the campaign treasurer of amounts and name address and occupation of 
each person who made a contribution over $100. 565 So.2d at 1336. ldaho requires the 
same disclosure, but for any amounts over $50. ldaho Code § 67-6610. Thus, Idaho's 
statutes are twice as restrictive today as Florida's statutes were 17 years ago. 
In addition to the three factors discussed in NlacKenzie, there are two additional 
factors that indicate that the campaign contributions are not legally sufficient grounds for 
a n e n n n o n h r n r  lnn n e r t c r n r t  a r r n  noneo n e r t v r k t r ,  m n n r t n r t  c n o  ntent t n t  t c t r n r t n k t  rnn r a t  tee t n r n r n r ~ \ r m  m-- -  0 .  
rec~isal in the instant case. Fourth, the passage of time since the contribution. The 
contribution had to have been over a year before Mr. Whelan brought his motion on 
behalf of the Lawrences. The fact of the contribution was available for Lawrences and 
Mr. Whelan to ascertain through the Secretary of State's website for nearly a year, yet 
nothing was mentioned until plaintiffs in the two cases renewed their motion for summary 
judgment. Fifth, the undersigned in fact did not know of the contribution by Ms. Weeks' 
firm until the June 13, 2007, hearing and heard of such only through Mr. Whelan. It is 
hard to have a quid pro quo relationship when one is ignorant of the contribution. 
The Florida Supreme Court cited a Nevada Supreme Court case: 
In Florida, as in Nevada, "leading members of the state bar play important 
and active roles in guiding the public's selection of qualified jurists. Under 
these circumstances, it would be highly anomalous if an attorney's prior 
participation in a justice's campaign could create a disqualifying interest, an 
appearance of impropriety or a violation of due process sufficient to require 
the justice's recusal from all cases in which the attorney might be involved." 
Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 774 P.2d 1003, 1020 (Nev. 
[ I  9891) cert. denied 493 U.S. 958, 11 0 S.Ct. 376, 107 L.Ed.2d 361 (1 989). 
565 So.2d at 1337-38. In NlacKenzie, the Florida Supreme Court held that even though 
the ground (campaign contributions) was legally insufficient, the motion for disqualification 
should have been granted because in ruling on the motion for disqualification, Judge 
Mackenzie "went beyond a mere determination of the legal sufficiency of the motion and 
passed upon the truth of the facts alleged." 565 So.2d at 1339. This is because Florida 
has a rule that prohibits such. The Florida Supreme Court stated: "...our rules clearly 
provide, and we have repeatedly held, that a judge who is presented with a motion for his 
disqualification 'shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged nor adjudicate the question 
of disqualification."' Id. "When a judge has looked beyond the mere legal sufficiency of a 
suggestion of prejudice and attempted to refute the charges of partiality, he has then 
exceeded the proper scope of his inquiry and on that basis alone established the groun 9 I 9 
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for his disqualification." Id. Idaho has no such rule. Obviously Texas has no such rule 
as the courts in the above cases discussed the allegations of prejudice. Obviously 
Nevada has no such rule as the reasons put forth by the judge who was sought to be 
disqualified (Justice Gunderson) were discussed in detail. Ainswon'la v. Combined Ins. 
Co. of America, 774 P.2d 1003, 1020-22 (Nev. 1989), cerl: denied493 U.S. 958, 110 
S.Ct. 376, 107 L.Ed.2d 361 (1 989). This Court finds that a simple denial of the Motion to 
Disqualify for Cause, without a discussion, would create an untenable result, in that 
neither Mr. Whelan nor his clients would have any idea how the Court treated these 
various allegations raised by Mr. Whelan. Should this decision be appealed and the 
Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals graft a rule that the judge may only adjudicate 
the question of disqualification, so be it. This Court is convinced that since there is no 
such rule, the more fair result to all parties and counsel is to discuss the various 
allegations. 
Ill. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that in the exercise of this Court's discretion, for the 
reasons set forth above, defendants' Motion for Disqualification for Cause pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2), in Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 is DENIED and defendants' 
Motion for Disqualification for Cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) in Tower Asset Sub, 
Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621 is DENIED. 
Entered this 2!jth day of June, 2007. 
I certify that on the 8'5 rue copy of the foregoing was mailed 
postage prepaid or was sent by ~nteroffice 
Lawyer Fax # -
John P. Whelan 208 664-2240 
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JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C, 
2 13  N. 4" Street 
Ccleur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele,: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER SUB ASSET INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
vs, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J, LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN 
HEARING DATE: 
TINE: 
JUDGE: John 7, Mitchell 
Defendants, 1 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
> ss. 
County of Kootenai 1 
I, Jahn P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1 .  i am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence. I have personal knowledge of the following facts and could 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 1 
competently testify. This affidavit i s  offered in sugporr of Defendants' motion 
for reconsideration of an order of' the Court denying Defendants' motion for 
disqualification for cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed on June 25, 2007. 
2.  in the course of: making the decision on Defendants' motion far 
disqualification for cause the Court obviously engaged in indcpendenr fact 
finding before reaching a decision on Defendants' motion. The Court even 
reviewed a case that was not identified by this affianx as being relevant to the 
motion for  disqualification. Additionally, the Court engaged in speculation in 
creating an argument for denial of the motion for disqualiPicarion when rhe clear 
inference to be drawn from the evidence offeredwas that rhe Court disqualified 
itself in the case of Yovjchin V. Bush (CV-2001-21 16) for bias and prejudice 
againsr rhis affianr. 
3,  The Court then based the denial of Defendants' motion .For 
disqualification on the Court's independent investigation of the facts and the 
speculation as to why the Court disqualified itself in Yovichin v. Bush (CV-2001 - 
21 16). The speculation and independent investigatian by the Court was 
improper, thus increasing the appearance of impartiality. Idaho Code of Judicial 
Conduct Canon 3.  
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 2 
DATED this 2. of July. 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
A tarn y for Defendants u 
nb Subscribed and sworn before me this q day of July, 2007. 
My Comrn. Expires: 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the qT' day of July, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by rhe method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: US. Mail, postage prepaid 
J Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N, 4th Sxree~ 
Coeur dXAlene, ID 83814 
Tele,: (208) 664-5831 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. I 
CASE NO, CV-03-04621 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
HEAR1 NG DATE: 
TIME; 
JUDGE: John T, Mitchell 
COME3 NOW, Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J, Lawrence, 
by and through their attorney, John P. Whelan, hereby move the Court for 
reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion 
for Disqualification for Cause, I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2). This Motion i s  made pursuant to 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1 l(a). This motion is made on the grounds 
that the court should have ruled on the motion based on the evidence offered. 
MOTION FOR ENtARtEMENT - 1 
The Court. should not have conducted i t s  own independent investigation of the 
facts without the permission of counsel. 
This motion is based on the court's files and records in this proceeding 
together with any affidavits filed in support of th is  motion. 
Defendants request oral argument . 
DATED this day of July, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
Whelan 
y for Defendants 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the qT' day of July, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, 10 8381 4 
Via: US. Nail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: -(208) 664-1 684 
STP,T,cl.T- :)t r[k:fi3 
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JOHN P, WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4'" Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele,: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (2081 664-2240 
IS&-# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER SUE ASSET INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
CASE NO. CV-03-04621 
NOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 




JUDGE: John 7. Nitchetl 
COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motions this 
court, pursuant to Rules 12(a) and 12(b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules for an 
Order for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order. Defendants request 
an Order granting them permEssion to appeal the Memorandum Decision and 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 1 
Order Denying Motion for Disqualification for Cause, 1.R.C.P 40(d)(Z) filed June 
25, 2007. 
This motion is made an the grounds that good cause was shown for 
disqualification. Moreover, the Court engaged in an independent investigation 
of the facts and considered evidence gathered independently by the Court and 
which was not presented by counsel in reaching the Court's decision to not 
disqualify the Court from further proceedings. The independent investigation 
also incorporated speculation that was not warranted by the facts. 
Defendants request oral argument. 
DATED this 7 day of July, 2007. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 2 1 2 9  
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9% day of July, 2007, 1 caused ro be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the followingz 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
via: .7 Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N, 41th Street 
Coeur d3AIene, I 0  8381 4 
Teie.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JU~ICIAL O ~ S T R ~ C T  THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C ~ U N T Y  OF KOOTENAl 
I t  
1 \ ;  
TOWER SUE ASSET INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, l, 
'ASE NO. CV-03-0462 1 
I J .  
; \ I ,  
I, John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, 
1 .  I am the attorney for Defendants, Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence. I have personal knowledge of and could 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHEUN - 7 
vs . 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. MWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 
DATE: August 6, 2007 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of: Kootenai 1 
competently testify. This affidavit i s  offered in support of Defendants' motion 
for reconsideration of an order of the Court d&nying Defendants' motion for 
disqualification for cause pursuanr to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed on June 25, 2007. 
I I ,  
2. On behalf of the Lawrences I filed lla motion requesting that rhe 
/ 1 ,  
Honorable John T. Mitchell disqualify hirnselfl/;or cause due ro bias and/or 
prejudice against your affiant. The Court did ridt rule on the motion when the 
I 
oral argument was presented on June 13, 20~$, rhe rnarrer was taken under 
submission I !I 
3 .  On June 25, 2007, the Court filed decision denying the motion 
for d~squallflcat~on. The decislon was filed on14 after the Court conducted i t s  
I j /  
I 
own independent ~nvestigation into the facts. inhe decision of the Court was 
obviously based on matters outside of the in this proceeding, and based 
an matters not even referenced by in the motion or at oral 
argument. 
, j !  
I I, 
1 j! 
4. Your affiant made no reference to t$e case of the Estare o f  Diane 
5 r ,: 
Rothe, Case N o  SP 00675 (2000). The C O $ ~  nevertheless performed an 
independent review of this care and opined that the rase may have been the 
I 
reason why the Court voluntarily disqualified ide l f  in the case of Yovichin 
\ 1: 
Bush, a case where your affiant was the  artorne9,of record for the Defendant in 
, I  1; 
the action. The Court speculated in its June 25, 2b07 decision that the voluntary 
' /  / I  
I 1 1  disqualification might have been filed due to tktl adversarial role rhar artorney 
Mitchell played in that case before taking the be? fi. 
, li- 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 2 
/ j /  
5 .  The fitate ~f Diane R~l"he was a $robate axtian. "dour affiant was 
the attorney for the estate. The will of Diane Rothe provided for a contingent 
bequest (in the sole discretion of the trustees) to the Idaho Trial Lawyers 
Association for educational purposes. The ldafbo Trial Lawyers Association drd 
not have a vested gift from the estate. The "gift' was entirely discretionary on 
the part of the trustee of  the trust. Attorney ~ o h h  T. Mitchell was the Treasurer 
af the ITLA at the time. Attorney Mitchell sent:l.ktter after letter to your affiant 
over a ten (1 0)  month period. The corresponde'nce demanded information from 
the file and sought to counsel your affiant as tb ;how to probate the estate and 
what his obligations were. At one point, attoiney Mitchell filed a Petition for 
Removal of Personal Representative seeking to remove my client from the 
position of personal representative of the estate. Attorney Mitchell sought to 
have the son of Diane Rothe removed from the :case so that a third party could 
I 
be appointed as personal representative of the estate. 
6 .  My client wanted to report attorney; Mitchell to the Stare Bar for 
I 
seeking the appointment of a substitute persodal' representathe when attorney 
Mitchell did not represent the person who attoraek Mitchell s ~ u g h t  to appoint as 
I 
substitute personal representative of the estate. i : 
j ! 
7. A true and correct copy of a letter acknowledging this fact is 
attached as Exhibit A. The letter was received frdh attorney Mitchell. 
I , I 
8 .  The relationship between myself and then attorney Mitchell was not 
I 
adversarial, it was hostile. Leeander James took over the Rothe case from 
i t  
attorney Mitchell when he took the bench. I 
: I 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 3 
I 
9.  Although nor mentiloned by the Court in the decision denying the 
motion for disqualification, attorney Mitchell and your affiant had a second case 
together before attorney Mitchell took the bench. That case was Direman v. K & 
L RV Sa/es and Service, lnc., Case No. CV-00-1973 I questioned attorney 
Mitchell% ethics in that case as well in the course af my representwon of R & L 
RV. That was a case where R 6 L RV purchaseld a, used recreational vehicle, 
~pparent ly a prior owner had rolled-back tb odometer reading of the 
vehicle-erasing thousands of miles of use. R & L was unaware of this fact when 
Ir bought that used recreational vehicle. 
10. The attorney who represented R & L RV before your affiant took aver 
the representation had erroneously answered a discovery request that made it 
appear that R & L had not been supplied an odometer disclosure form when in 
fact it had. Your affiant brought the error to the attention of attorney Mitchell. 
Although R & L RV cammitred no wrang, attorney Nltchell would not dismiss the 
company from the lawsuit. f questioned the ethics of attorney Mitchell in 
continuing to pursue R & L RV even though the company committed no wrong. 
11. R & L RV eventually bought its way out of the! case through a 
statutory offer of settlement. 
12 .  The cases of Rothe and R & L R V  provide the background for why 
the Honorable John T. Mitchell voluntarily disqjualified himself in the case of 
Yovichin v. Bush, a case where 1 was counsel for rhie Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 4 
DATED this 7 day of July, 2007. 
JOHN P. WWELAN, P.C, 
Atr rn y for Defendants u,  
Subscribed and sworn before me this day of July, 2007. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. W H E U N  - 5 
I HEREBY CERTIFY ihat on the %?day ofJuly. Z O O 7  1 caused to be 
served a rrue and correct copy of the foregoing: by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at taw 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: /US. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C, 
2 1 3 N. 4" h~rreer 
Coeur d%lene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5897 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C$UNTY OF KOOTENAI 
I /// 
I 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
TOWER ASSET SUB, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
~EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
~ O T I O N  FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
/ / I  
t / 1 1  
1 1  
CASE NO CV-03-04621 
i 14 
I l l  
(EARING DATE: August 6, 2007 
YME: 1 :30 p.m. 
1 1  
I J ~ ~ ~ D G E :  John T. Mitchell 
Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Bren a J. Lawrence, by and through I 
/ /9 their attorney of record, john P. Whelan, submits the following memorandum in 
I l l  
I 
support of motion for reconsideration: I ,  
I 





I ,  
1 b 
STATEM EMT-Q? FACTS 
I 
Counsel for the Lawrences filed a motion requesting that the Honorable 
I 
John T. Mitchell disqualify himself for cause due (0 bias andlor prejudice against 
the Lawrences' counsel. The Court did not rule dn the motion when the oral 
argument was presented on June 13,  2007. 1 I.( 
On June 25, 2007, the Court filed its decisikn denying the motion for 
disqualificarion The decision war filed only ahel  the Court conducted its own 
I 
independent investigation into the facts. The deii~sion of the Court was 
13 
obviously based on matters outside of the recordiiin this proceeding, and based 
// 
on matters not even referenced by counsel in theiimotion or at oral argument. 
j', 
Counsel for the Lawrences made no refere*e to the case of thegstate o f  
I/ Diane Rothe, Case No. SP 00675. The Court nev pheless performed an f independent review of this case and opined that the case may have been the 
reason why the Court voluntarily disqualified irse 1' S in the case of Yovichin v. 
/b 
Bush, a case where the Lawrences' counsel was tliie attorney of record for the 
I! 
Defendants in the action. The Court speculated ivl i t s  June 25, 2007 decision 
I: 
that the voluntary disqoalificatSon might have be n filed due to the  adversarial I! 
role that attorney Mitchell played in that case before taking the bench. 
The Estate of Diane Rorhe was a probate acikion. John P. Mhelan was the 
I! 
attorney far the estate. The will of Diane Rothe pkovided for a conringent 
I1 ' 
bequest to the ldaho Trial Lawyers Association fo educational purposes. The % i 
Idaho Trial Lawyers Association did not have a ve$ted gift from the estate. The 
i, 
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"gifr" was discretionary wirh the trustees of a trud$ thar was to be created. 
1 
'i 
Attorney John T, Mitchell was the Treasurer of the: I T U  at the time. Attorney 
i 
Mitchell sent over a dozen letters to anorney ~ lud lan  over a ten (1 0) month 
period. The correspondence demanded infor om the file and sought to 
counsel attorney Whelan as to how he should pr ate the esrare and what his 
obligations were. At one point, attorney Mitche led a Petition for Removal of 
Personal Representative reeking to remove atto Whelan's client from the 
position of personal representar~ve of the estat torney Mitchell sought to 
have the son of' Diane Rothe removed from the so that a third party could 
be appointed as personal representative of the 
Attorney Whelan's client wanted to repo ey Mirchell to the State Bar 
for seeking the appointment of a substitute p epresentative when 
attorney Mitchell did not represent the person wkfb attorney Mitchell sought to 
/I 
appoint as substitute personal representative of 
A copy of a let ter acknowledging this fact to the accompanying 
supplemenral affidavit of John P. Whelan. 
The relationship between attorney Whelan ttorney Mitchell was 
not adversarial, it was hostile. Leeandcr James t e Rorhe case from 
attorney Mitchell when he took the bench. 
Although not mentioned by the Court in t denying the motion 
far disqualificatian, attorney Mitchell and artorn ad a second case 
together before attorney MDtchell took the benc was Dj&man v. R & 
L RVSales and Service, Inc., Case No. CV-00-1 
MEMORLZNDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDE 
questioned attorney Mitcheli's ethics in that case:ii'n the course af Whelan's 
, [ I  
representation af R & L RV. That was a case where R & L RV purchased a used 
l ' $ l  
recreational ve hirle. Apparently a prior owner rolled-back the odometer 
reading of the vehicle-erasing thousands of of use. R & L was unaware of 
this fact when 7r bought that used recreation 
The attorney who represented R $ L R torney Whelan took over 
the representation had erroneously answere ry request that made it 
appear that R & L had not been supplied an Psclosure form when in 
fact it had. Attorney Whelan broughnhe er rention af attorney 
Mitchell. Although R 81 L RV committed no ney Mitchell would not 
dismiss the company from the lawsuit. Att questioned the ethics 
of attorney Mitchell in continuing to pursu n though the company 
committed no wrong. 
R & L RV eventually bought i t s  way through a statutory 
offer af settlement. 
The cases of Rurfie and R & L R V p  round for why the 
Honorable John T. Mitchell voluntarily di f in the case of 
Yovichin v. Bush, a case where attorney sei for the Defendanxs. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDE 
1 'i I 
! 
Although stared in dicta, the Supreme Cou,qt in State v. Breyer, 40 Idaho 
//1 
324, 232, P. 560 (1 925) alluded to the fact that 14 would be clearly improper for  
:$ , 
a Judge to make an independent investigatian O F  he facts in a case (or motion), 
I / I l /  1 ; 
,ill ' 
ecites that a judge shall 
he judge's impartiality 
here the judge has a 
' s  lawyer, gr hxs. 
id suggest, at the very 
ight be reasonably be 
rove the Lawrences' 
n of the facts. This is 
position of having to 
e concluslons reached 
were not justified. 
he motion for 
d isqualification for cause based on these facts. 
, , -  - A  I 2 _t -‘....~i J I I  r I r I, - I z ~ A L  ' J t r  I 
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& I  ! 11 tJL3 
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1 1 1  4 
I /i 
37 day of July, 2007. I DATED this / 1 1 / 
l l / /  
IRerpecrfuliy /I/ I submitted, 
I # ,  / 
l j ,  
111 i 
~ I O H N  P. WHELAN, P.C. 
-. 
MEMOWNDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDE 
I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I 
I 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that an the z 5 i a y  of July, 2007. I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing (jy the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 1 i 
I !  
/ !  
Susan P. Weeks / I 
James, Vernon & Weeks I 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' A1 ne, ID 8381 4 
I 
4U.S. Mail, portage prepaid Via: 
l1 
/ I  
I 
I 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 1 I 
I I 
O . f / 2 4 / 2 0 0 7  0 3  20 F A X  6G42240 John P Whe ian ,  P C #s<T- &SS 
**v * s  
JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4'lh Street 
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISEM 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-03-04621 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFlDAVlT OF JOHN P. WHELAN 
(WITH EXHIBIT ATTACHED) 
HEARING DATE: August 6, 2007 
TINE: 1 :30 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, John P, Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence. I have personal knowledge of the following facts and could 
. 4  
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF jOHN P. WHElAhl - 1 @ 
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+&)$#s q&2? 
competently testify. This affidavit is  offered in support of Defendants' motion 
for reeonsideratEorn of an order of the Court denying Defendants' motion for 
disqualification for cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed on June 25, 2007. 
2. On behalf of the Lawrences I filed a motion requesting that the 
Honorable John T. Mitchell disqualiQ himself far cause due to bias and/or 
prejudice against your affiant. The Court did not rule on the motion when the 
oral argument was presented on June 13, 2007, the matter was taken under 
su brnission 
3. On fune 25, 2007, the Court filed i ts  decision denying the motion 
for disqualification. The decision was filed only after the Court conducted its 
own independent investigation into the facts. The decision of the Court was 
obviously based on matters outside of the record in this proceeding, and based 
on matters not even referenced by your affiant in the motion or at oral 
argument. 
4, Your affiant made no reference to the case of the Estate o f  Diane 
Rothe, Case No. SP 00675 (2000). The Court nevertheless performed an 
independent review of this case and opined that the case may have been the 
reason why the Court voluntarily disqualified itself in the case of Yo~ithln V. 
Bush, a case where your affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendant in 
the action. The Court speculated in its June 25, 2007 decision that rhe voluntary 
disqualification might have been filed due to the adversarial role that attorney 
Mitchell played in that case before taking the bench. 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 2 
5. The Estate of Diane Rolhc was a probate action. Your affiant was 
the aaorney for the estate. The will of Diane Rothe provided For a contingent 
bequest (in the sole discretion of the trustees) to the ldaho Trial Lawyers 
Association for educational purposes. The ldaho Trial Lawyers Association did 
not have a vested gift from the estate, The "gift" war; entirely discretionary on 
the pan of the trustee of the trust. Anorney John T. Mitchell was the Treasurer 
of the ITM at the time. Attorney Mitchell sent letter after letter to your affiant 
over a ten (1 0) month period. The correspondence demanded information from 
the fi le and sought to counsel your affiant as to how to probate the estate and 
what his obligations were. At one point, artorney Mitchell filed a Petition for 
Removal of Personal Representative seeking to remove my client from the 
position of personal representative of the estate, Attorney Mitchell sought to 
have the son of Diane Rothe removed from the case so that a third party could 
be appointed as personal representative of the estate. 
6. My client wanted to report attorney Mitchell to the State Bar for 
seeking the appointment of a substitute personal representative when attorney 
Mitchell did not represent the person who attorney Mitchell sought to appoint as 
substitute personal representative of the estate. 
7. A true and correct copy of a letter acknowledging this fact i s  
attached as Exhibit A. The letter was received from attorney Mitchell. 
8. The relationship between myself and then attorney Mltchell was not 
adversarial, it was hostile. Leeander James took over the Rorhe case from 
attorney Mitchell when he took the bench. 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 3 
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9. Although not mentioned by the Court in the decision denying the 
motion for disqualification, attorney Mitchell and your affiant had a second case 
together before attorney Mitchell took the bench. That case was Diteman v. /? & 
1. RV Sales and Service, lnc., Case No. CV-00-1973 1 questioned attorney 
Mitchell's ethics in that case as well in the course of my representation of R & L 
RV. That was a case where R & L RV purchased a used recreational vehicle. 
Apparently a prior owner had rolled-back the odometer reading of the 
vehicle-erasing thousands of miles of use, R & L was unaware of this fact when 
it bought that used recreational vehicle. 
10. The attorney who represenred R & L RV before your affiant took over 
the representation had erroneously answered a discovery request that made it 
appear that R & L had not been supplied an odometer disclosure form when in 
fact it had. Your affiant brought the error to the attention of attorney Mitchell. 
Although R & L RV committed no wrong, attorney Mitchell would not dismiss the 
company from the lawsuit. 1 questioned the ethics of attorney Mitchell in 
continuing to pursue R & L RV even though the company committed no wrong. 
11. R & L RV eventually bought i t s  way out of the case through a 
statutory offer of settlement. 
1 2. The cases of Rothe and R & L R V  provide the background for why 
the Honorable John T. Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in the case of 
Yovichin v. Bush, a case where I was counsel for the Defendants. 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 4 
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DATED r h i i v  day of July, 2007" 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
~ q f l n  b.Whelan 
!4Wy for Defendants 
Subscribed and sworn before me this ~ # ~ ' d a ~  of July, 2007. 
Notary public in and fobhehtaie of Idaho 
Residing at: ??st- akv '/ 
My Comrn. Expires: 12/29/ 11 
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(20%) 684-8111 Telephone WONAS A. MXTmELL 
JoHN T. MITCHELL 
A ~torneys At L ~ W  
408 E. Sherrnm Avanua, 3uita 318 
Caeur d'lllene, ID 83814.2778 
December 1,2000 
Fax: (208) 765-1046 
J. P, Whelm 
702 N. 4'h, Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 14 
Dear Mr. Whelan: 
RE; Estate of Dianne Rothe 
1 have scheduled a hearing on our Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for 
Cause, and for Appointment of Successor Personal Representative, for January 29, 2001, at 
9130 a.m, before Judge Marano. A Notice of Hearing is enclosed. 
Perhaps this matter can be resolved short of that hearing. 
The purpose of this letter is to clear up some of the things that you stated during the 
November 27,2000 deposition of Jim Hannon. 
You stated that your client, Butch Rothe, wanted you to turn me into the Idaho Stare 
Bar. I encouraged you to do that if you felt necessary. You tl1e11 told me that you told your 
cl;~a:s :c ttirn me i3t3 the b z  t5c;nrsel~res. 4,oain, if  either you nr they feel that I have done 
anything unethical, please have them report me to the bar. If you feel I have done anytlling 
unethical, you have an affirmative obligation to turn me into the bar. 
During the deposition, you asked Jim Hannon if he had ever discussed with D i a n e  
Rorhe, that her whole gift to the foundation could fail because Jirn Hannon named hiinself as 
a Tmstee. That theory which you articulated finds no support in the law. Please review 
Ida110 Rule of Professional Conduct 1,8(c) which states that a lawyer shall not prepare an 
z 
instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as a parent, cliild, sibling, or X 
spouse any substantial g& fkom client, including a testamentary Rift, except where the client 
is related to the donee. Clearly, Jim Harmon as a trustee is not the recipient of any "gift" 
W 
under the tmst. Case law from other jurisdictions states that a lawyer-beneficiarv's 
paxticipation in the preparation or execution of the Will raises the presumption of undue 
influence, again, Mr. H m o n  was not, nor can he be a beneficiarv under Dianne's Will. A 
similar result is found when you review ABA C m o n  5, ethical considwarion 5-6, that slates 
'4
a lawyer shall not conscientiously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee, or 1 4 
lawyer in an instrument, In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such, 
J. P. Melm 
Page 2 
December 1, 2000 
care shall be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the rylpeamce of impropriety. I think Mr. 
Harmon covered in his deposition, the fact that it was Dianne who wished Jim I-Imnon and 
her other attorneys, to serve as GO-trustees. 
]In any event, there are hvo separate issues, You asked if Jim Harmon had considered 
the fact that he had named himself as trustee, to be an ethical violation. If you view it as an 
unethical violation,  yo^ have a duty to report Mr. Harmon to the bar. An entirely separate 
issue is whether the fact that Jim Hamon is named as a trustee causes the entire gift to fail, 
which is exactly what you insinuated during the deposition. There simply isn't any legal 
basis to support your alcgation. 
Next, in the deposition you raised the theory that if these attorney trustees resigned, 
and since there is no provision for replacement, the trust would fail. Once again, there is no 
legal theory to support your claim. Please look at Idaho Code $68-101 and Ida110 Code 968- 
3 02. The trust survives the renunciation of other trustees, and if, by chance, all the trustees 
should renounce, the District Cow appoint replacements. 
You mentioned that all of the attorney trustees had renounced their interest: in serving 
as trustees, but that begs the question. The foundation hasn't been created yet, due to your 
client's failure to perform his duties as personal representative. I don't see how a11y 
renunciation can be valid until the estate kicks loose the hnds to create the fo~~ndation. 
ARw the deposition, you asked about the possibility of settlement. The Idaho Trial 
Lawyers Association is certainly interested in settlement. When you discussed settlement, 
you mentioned the possibility of this case being dragged out, and the specter of attorney fees 
reducing the value of any money that could be available for the foundation. I suggest you 
take another look at the probate code to determine who will be paying for your attorney's 
fees. Since the probate was converted to a formal probate, you cannot receive attorney's fees 
out of probate assets without the couxtk prior approval. W i l e  I agree that your office would 
be entitled to attorney's fees for preparing the initial probate pleadings, your office is not 
entitled to any other attorney fees for time spent contesting the validity of the Will. It would 
be unethical for an attorney to charge attorney's fees against the estate for such an action, as 
the personal represmtative has a duty to the legacies under the Will, to enforce the Will md 
defend the Will, not contest the Will. Additionally, the personal representative has a duty to 
inaxirnize the estate left for t l~e  legacies. The personal representative sirnply cannot challenge 
the valid~ty of the Will, and seek to have his attorney fees for doing so paid from the asscts 
from the estate. I direct your attention to Idaho Code $15-3-703(a), Idaho Code 5 15-3-709, 150 
Idaho Code 5 15-3-712 and Idaho Code $15-3-715(21). 
O i i Z 4 i % U O i  D Y  2 1  F A X  K G 4 2 2 4 0  John  P Whe ian ,  P C 
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J. P. We lan  
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December 1,2000 
I also don't see how you are going to get your attorney fees paid for out of the estate, 
for time spent discussing matters with me, since tlie vast majority oithat time has been spent 
with my wing to get you to get your client to meet his duties under Idciho law to the 
beneficiaries under the Will. 
My suggestion is as follows. Your client prepares a detailed iitventory and accounting 
that can be verified, and find out what is left over after the payment of legitimate expenses. 
This would include itemized statements of the interest bearing account showing what intetesr 
h u  accrued since the account's inception, and also what expenses have been paid by the 
estate since the decedent's death and what expenses are claimed and unpaid against the csrate. 
The trustees can then convene to determine what is to be done with the remaining funds. 
JTM:cs 
Enc. 
cc: Kay Shields 
Jim Hannon 
( JO? T. Mitchell 
CERTIFICATE OF SEWICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the v d a y  ofJuly, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N, Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
.S. Mall, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4" Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
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DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. I 
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT 
HEARING DATE: August 7, 
2007 
TIME: 4:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their counsel of  record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motion this 
court, pursuant to Rules 6(b) and 56(c) and 56(f) of  the Idaho Rules of  Civil 
Procedure, for an enlargement of  time in which to file their opposition in 
response to  Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendants request to 
file their response on or after November 1,  2007. The affidavits of  John P. 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 1 
Whelan and Doug Lawrence are offered in support of this motion. Defendant's 
request oral argument. 
This motion i s  made on the grounds that Defendant's have not had the 
opportunity to complete discovery and determine the whereabouts of  the 
various witnesses whose affidavits are relied upon by Plaintiff, as Plaintiff's 
counsel filed a motion for summary judgment shortly after the Remittitur issued 
in this case. Defendants made a prior motion for enlargement that was never 
ruled upon by the Court. No further discovery has taken place since the motion 
was made due to the fact that the Court has yet to  rule on the original motion 
for enlargement. Defendants have yet to complete their discovery in the instant 
action, so additional time to respond to Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
i s  warranted. Defendants anticipate that they will take the depositions of each 
person who has submitted an affidavit for Plaintiff in this action. Many of the 
witnesses are believed to reside out of state. 
DATED this 2 d d a y  of July, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 2 
154 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of July, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d l  Al ne, ID 8381 4 
Via: 'US. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 2 3 N. 4" Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
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DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
HEARING DATE: August 7, 2007 
TIME: 4:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL 
Plaintiffs, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by and through their 
attorney of  record, John P. Whelan, hereby move the court to strike the 
objectionable portions of  the Affidavits of  Harold Funk, John Rook, Robert Hall 
and Susan Weeks, identified herein, which affidavits were offered in support to 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. This motion i s  made on the grounds 
of  I.R.C.P. Rule 7(b)(l), 1 2(f) and 56(e) and the case of Posey v. Ford Motor 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 1 
7 '( 
J 2 
Credff Go., 1 1 1 P. 3d 162 (Id. Ct App. 2005). Defendants requests oral 
argument. 
AFFIDAVIT OF FUNK 
Defendants move to strike the following portions of the Affidavit of Harold 
Funk: 
Defendants move to strike Ex. A on the same grounds. 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 2 
predecessor is irrelevant 
under the doctrine of 
last sentence predecessor is irrelevant 




Paragraph 4, pg. 2, 
1 s t  sentence 
Paragraph 6, pg. 3, 
4th through 7th 
sentences 
Paragraph 6 ,  pg. 3, 








Funk fails to identify the 
relevant time period. 
Funk's sale agreement 
merged into the deed to 
Human Synergistics. 
The Funk's intent i s  
irrelevant parole evidence 
in that the land contract 
merged with the deed 
and the deed i s  not 
ambiguous. 
Defendants also move to strike Ex. "F" as well as hearsay evidence. 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 3 
second to last statement of "continuous 
use" is not supported by 
Relevance; hearsay The sale agreement 
last sentence merged with the deed; 
therefore the land sale 
contract is irrelevant in 
9. 
1 s t  sentence 
Paragraph 9, pg. 4, 




which parcel he refers to, 
rendering the statement 
irrelevant. Funk also 
does not identify which 
"same private road" he 
refers to, and whether 
the road is on the 
Lawrence parcel. 
AFFIDAVIT OF lOHN ROOK 
Defendants move to strike the following portions of the Affidavit of John 
Rook: 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 4 
2nd sentence foundation for his 
2. 
3. 
Paragraph 4, pgs. 2 






claimed knowledge and 
does not identify which 
"road" he refers to, nor 
does he place the road 
on the Lawrence parcel. 
Rook does not lay the 
foundation for his 
claimed knowledge and 
does not identify which 
"road" he refers to, nor 
does he place the road 
on the Lawrence parcel. 
Rook does not lay the 
foundation for his 
claimed knowledge and 
does not identify which 
"road" he refers to, nor 
does he place the road 
on the Lawrence parcel. 
I All references to a 
road in the affidavit 
I Paragraph 4, pg. 3, 
6th sentence 
Paragraph 4, pg. 3, 
last sentence 
I Foundation; relevance / Rook's repeated 
reference to roads or a 
road i s  irrelevant in that 
Rook does not identify 










statement about the right 
to use '"he road" lacks 
foundation and violates 
the best evidence rule 
and the parole evidence 
rule in that the deed to 
Kootenai Broadcasting i s  
the best evidence of i t s  
rights, not the 
conclusionary statements 
of Rook. 
Rook makes no reference 
to the use of Kootenai 
Broadcasting of the road 
other than this 
conclusionary statement. 
The statement lacks 
foundation and i s  an 
improper legal opinion 
offered by a lay witness. 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 5 
AFFIDAVIT OF HALL 
Defendants move to strike the following portions of the Affidavit of Robert 
Hall: 
paragraph 5 ,  pg. 3, irrelevant hearsay 
without a foundation 
establishing that the road 
crosses the Lawrence 
notice of  assignment. 
The Ex. A lease 
referenced requires prior 
written authorization 
from Hall prior to any 
assignment. In that 
Tower's rights, if any, 
stem from an alleged 
leasehold, Hall must 
necessarily establish the 
foundation that he 
accepted the purported 
assignment in writing. 
8. 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 6 
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statement about Funk's 
access i s  devoid of 
foundation and therefore 
irrelevant. 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 7 
162 
road to which he refers 
or the location of the 
road, nor does he 
5. 
6 .  
Paragraph 7, pg. 3, 
last sentence 







source of knowledge. He 
purports to render an 
opinion about Switzer's 
access without any 
foundation for his 
statement 
Hall's conclusionary 
statement is not 
supported by any 
foundational facts. The 
road to which Hall refers 
i s  not identified. 
The "road" i s  not 
identified; the claimed 
basis for Hall's 
knowledge i s  not 
identified; Hall offers 
testimony about the 
location of land without 
establishing his expertise 
as a surveyor. 
foundation and is 
sentences; Exhibit B inadmissible hearsay 
identified; no foundation 
i s  laid for Hall's claimed 
AFFIDAVIT OF WEEKS 
Defendants move to  strike the following portions of the Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks: 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 8 
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for which no foundation 
2 .  
3 .  
4. 
5. 
Paragraph 8, pg. 6, 
and Exhibit "Z" 
Paragraph 9, pg. 6 
and Exhibit "AA" 
Paragraph 10, pg. 6 
and Exhibit "BB" 
Paragraph 1 1 ,  pg. 6 









has been laid. The 
deposition testimony is  
irrelevant to this 
proceeding. 
No foundation is laid for 
this hearsay document. 
No foundation i s  laid for 
this hearsay document. 
No foundation is  laid for 
this hearsay document. 
No foundation i s  laid for 
this hearsay document. 
this hearsay document. 
nd Exhibit "FF" 
DATED this day of July, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
y/Ll I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the r day of July, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
18-75 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d l  Alene, ID 8381 4 
4 . S .  Mail, postage prepaid Via: 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
Joh P. Whelan i? 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
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CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND 
BRENDA LAWRENCE TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 
HEARING DATE: August 7, 2007 
TIME: 4:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, by and through 
their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, submits the following opposition to 
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment: 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
PLAINTIFF - 1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tower Assets Sub, Inc.'s unverifiedcomplaint alleges that it "has a vested 
leasehold interest in certain real property leased from Robert and Brenda   all."' 
As the alleged holder of  a leasehold interest, Plaintiff seeks to establish that it 
has a right to cross the land of Defendants under theories of  easement by 
necessity, by implication or by prescriptive use.* Plaintiff has previously alleged 
that it had an express easement, but that theory was rejected on appeal. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has previously ruled in this case that Tower 
would not have standing to seek to quiet title to the land owned by Lawrence or 
  all.^ Yet Tower persists in i t s  efforts to establish an easement for the Ha// 
parcelunder theories of easement by necessity or implication. That is, Tower 
Page 1 ,  paragraph I, of Plaintiff's Complaint. No evidence has been offered in support 
of this allegation. The statute of frauds requires leaseholds in duration of one year or more to 
be in writing. (Idaho Code 9-503). 
Second, third and fourth Causes of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint. No admissible 
evidence has been offered that Plaintiffhas been granted any interest whatsoever in the land at 
issue in Plaintiff's Complaint. At best, Plaintiff has established that it may have a leasehold 
interest in land owned by Hall. The deed to Hall (marked as Exhibit U to the Affidavit of Weeks) 
makes no mention of the Lawrence parcel. If Hall has no right to use the Lawrence parcel, Hall's 
leaseholders would have no rights either. Hall is  not a party to this action. 
The Supreme Court ruled as follows: "Tower will have standing to seek iniunctive 
relief i f  it can establish it has an alleged legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain road -
easement. As lessee of the alleged dominant estate, Tower derives its right to use the alleged 
easement from i ts  lessor, Hall". (Emphasis Added). Tower Asset Sub, lnc. v. Lawrence, 143 
ldaho 71 0 (2007). 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
PLAINTIFF - 2 
attempts quiet title to the Hall and Lawrence parcels, as opposed to merely 
seeking an injunction to enjoin an interference with access. Hall has no 
established easement by necessity or by implication. Therefore, he cannot lease 
or assign those rights to others. 
Accordingly, the only theory of easement that can be advanced by Tower 
would be a theory based on prescriptive use. 
The opposition of  Douglas and Brenda Lawrence i s  based on this 
memorandum, the court records and the affidavits that have been filed in this 
action. The Lawrences have also filed a motion for enlargement of time to 
respond to this motion for summary judgment. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMED "UNDISPUTED FACTS" 
Many of the facts alleged by Plaintiff as bing "undisputed" are not 
supported by the record in this action. However, rather than addressing each 
erroneous fact here, Defendants would invite the Court's attention to the 
admissible portions of the affidavits and the competent and admissible evidence 
in this action. 
DEFENDANTS PARTIAL STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1.  Since 1966, General Telephone has had a deeded right to use an 
access road that crosses the Lawrence parcel in section 21. 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
PLAINTIFF - 3 
2. General Telephone has a legal right to cross sections 2 1 and 28  (see 
Exhibit "X3"Affidavit of Weeks); whereas Funk has never had the right to cross 
section 28. 
3 .  There is no evidence that Section 28 was ever owned by Funk, 
therefore there i s  no unity of t i t le  in this case. 
4. The owner of  Section 28 i s  not a party to this action. 
5. Contrary to the allegations made, Funk has always had access to his 
lands from Mellick Road. 
6. Funk i s  not a party to this action. 
7. No clear and convincing evidence has been offered to establish a 
prescriptive easement. 
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment should not be granted if reasonable people could 
reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inference from the evidence, as 
summary judgment i s  proper where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of 
material fact. Farm Credit o f  Spokane v. Stevenson, 1 25 ldaho 270, 869 P.2d 
1365; Rule 56(c), ldaho R. Civ. P. 
Summary judgment i s  only proper if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admission on the file together with the affidavits, i f  any, show that there is  no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party i s  entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 1.R.C.P 56(c). 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
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IF the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the trial court 
should grant the motion for summary judgment. Farm Credit Bank v. Stevenson, 
125 ldaho 270, 272, 896 P.2d 1 365, 1 367 (1 994). If the nonmoving party does 
not come forward with evidence as provided in I.R.C.P. 56(c), then summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party." Meikle v. Torry 
Watson, 138 ldaho 680 (2003). Summary judgment is properly granted in favor 
of the moving party when the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party's case upon which that party bears the burden 
of proof at trial. Meikle v. Torry Watson, 138 ldaho 680 (2003). 
STANDING 
The issue of standing is jurisdictional. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for 
Term Limits, 135 ldaho 121, 124, 1 5  P.3d 1 1  29, 1 132 (2000). The issue of 
standing may be raised at any time. Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 ldaho 33, 35, 644 
P.2d 355, 357 (1 982). Only the owner of the dominant estate has standing to 
quiet title to an easement appurtenant to that estate. Beach Lateral Water Users 
Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 ldaho 600, 130 P.3d 1 1  38 (2006). 
There are but two types of easements: 
(1) Easements in gross; and 
(2) Appurtenant easements. 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
PLAINTIFF - 5 
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An easement in gross is personal to the easement holder. King v. Lang, 126 
ldaho 905, 42 P.3d 698 (2002). There i s  no evidence that the Lawrences or 
anyone else created such an easement in favor of Tower. 
"An easement appurtenant i s  a right to use a certain parcel, the servient 
estate, for the benefit of another parcel the dominant estate. Essentially, an 
easement appurtenant serves the owner of the dominant estate in a way that 
cannot be separated from his rights in the land." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 ldaho 
225, 230, 76 P.3d 969 (2003). 
Accordingly, in light of Tower's allegation that it is a lessee of  Hall, Tower 
lacks standing to assert claims of easement by necessity or by implication. 
As alluded to by the ldaho Supreme Court in its opinion pertaining to the 
matter at hand, Tower has standing to seek injunctive rel ief if it can demonstrate 
that it has an existing right to use the subject easement. Since Hall has 
established no easement by implication or necessity, Tower lacks standing to 
pursue those theories. 
If Tower can establish a prescriptive easement, it would have standing to 
enjoin the interference with such a right. 
TOWER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A LESSEE OR ASSIGNEE OF THE HALL 
LEASE 
The only factual allegations in the record regarding Tower's status are 
contained in the unverifiedcomplaint of Tower and in the Affidavit of Robert 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
PLAINTIFF - 6 
Hall (filed Sept. 1 3 ,  2004) offered by Plaintiff in support of  its first motion for 
summary judgment. 
Hall does not state that Tower is his lessee, he merely states that the land 
was leased to Nextel West Corp. and that "we received notice that this lease was 
assigned to Tower Parent Corp. and Tower Asset Sub, l n ~ . " ~  
Hall goes on to state "Tower Asset Sub, Inc. continues to lease the site 
from us.' A copy o f  the Nextell lease is attached to Hall's affidavit as Exhibit "A" 
The lease prohibits the assignment of the lease by Nextel without Hall's prior 
written ~ o n s e n t . ~  Hall's affidavit does not recite that he provided the written 
consent or that he otherwise agreed to the assignment. 
Accordingly, Tower has failed to establish that it is even a lessee.' 
Tower's status is certainly a genuine issue of fact. 
See Hall Affidavit, pg. 2, paragraph 4. 
Id, paragraph 5. 
See Hall affidavit, Exhibit "A", paragraph 14. 
This issue has been raised previously and Tower has offered no additional proof on 
the issue. The inference therefore, is that Tower has no proof. 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
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PERNlSSlVE 
As stated by the affidavit of  Daniel Rebor offered by Plaintiff in support of 
i t s  motion for summary judgment, Nextel obtained an access license from the 
~awrences.~ Tower took an assignment of that access agreement and "[Slince 
May of 1 999 Plaintiff has continuously paid the monthly licensing fee by check 
which identifies Spectra Site as payee.' 
For the last ten (1 0) years, Tower's use of the Lawrence easement has 
been permissive. Permissive use negates any claim for an easement by 
prescription. Melendez v. Hintz, 1 1  1 Idaho 401, 724 P.2d 137 (1 986). 
ELEMENTS OF EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION NOT SATISFIED 
Funk severed the Lawrence parcel from his remaining land in 1975 when 
he entered into the Sale Agreement with Human Synergistics." In 1972, Funk 
acquired the right to cross the Mead property in Section 21 but Funk had no 
right to cross Section 28 to access his lands in Sections 21 and 22. 
See affidavit of  Rebor, filed September 13, 2004, paragraphs 3-5. 
Id, paragraph 6. 
lo See affidavit of  Weeks filed September 13, 2004, pg. 2, paragraph "e" and Exhibit "E" 
thereto. 
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The parcel at issue in this litigation was not created (or severed) from 
Funk's other lands until 1977 when Funk conveyed to Rasmussen/Chamberlain." 
Clearly, then, until the 1977 conveyance to Rasmussen/Chamberlain, the 
land allegedly leased by Tower was but an undivided portion of the acreage held 
by Funk in Section 22. Funk had access to that section via Mellick Road 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record that suggests that there was 
an existing access road to the land that would eventually become the 
Rasmussen/Chamberalin parcel i n  f 975 when Funk severed what would become 
the Lawrence parcel (the servient estate) from Funk's other holdings (the 
dominant estate). 
Therefore, the easement claimed by Tower did not exist in 1975 when the 
servient estate was severed from the dominant estate, i.e. there was no prior use. 
Furthermore, Funk never had the legal right to cross Section 28 from 
Section 21 to access his land in Section 22. Funk cannot create by implication 
that which did not exist in fact in 1975. There was no access road to the land at 
issue in this action in 1975. Thus, the key element to establish an easement by 
implication is lacking in the instant action. 
The Idaho Supreme Court stated in the case of Bear island Water Assoc., 
Id., that: 
To establish an easement by implication from prior use, 
the party seeking to establish the easement must 
l1 Id, page 4, paragraph 3(a)-(e). 
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demonstrate three essential elements: (1) unity of title or 
ownership and subsequent separation by grant of  the 
dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long 
enough before conveyance of the dominant estate to 
show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) 
the easement must be reasonably necessary to the 
proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Close v. 
Rensink, 95 ldaho 172, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387; Davis v. 
Cowen, 83 ldaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d 403, 406-07 
(1 961 ). (Emphasis added). 
The third element recited above requires proof that a disputed access is 
reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. As stated 
in the affidavits of Douglas Lawrence and Bruce Anderson, Funk has always had 
access to his Section 22 property via Mellick Road. Funk or his successors can, 
and should. provide access to Tower. 
EASEMENT BY NECESSITY 
An easement by necessity is  founded on the following legal theory: 
"A way of  necessity is an easement arising from an 
implied grant or implied reservation; it is  of  common law 
origin and is supported by the rule of sound public 
policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for 
occupancy or successful cultivation ... It is a universallv 
established principle that where a tract of land i s  
conveved which i s  separated from the hiqhway bv other 
lands of the qrantor or surrounded bv his lands or bv his 
and those of third persons, there arises, by implication, 
in favor of the grantee, a way of necessity across the 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
PLAINTIFF - 1 0 
premises of  the qrantor to the highway." (Emphasis 
added). 
Burley Brick andSand Co. v, Gofer, 102 ldaho 333, 335, 629 P.2d 1 16, 1 1  68 
(1 98l)(quoting 17A Am. Jur. Easements 5 58 (1 957)); see 25 Am. Jur. 2d 
Easements and Licenses 5 5  30-03 1 (2005). One who claims an easement by 
necessity across another's land must prove "(1) unity of  title and subsequent 
separation of the dominant and servient estates; (2) necessity of  the easement at 
the time of severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." Bear 
island WaterAss'n, inc. v. Brown, 125 ldaho 71 7, 725, 874 P.2d 528, 536 (1 994). 
In the matter at hand, Tower cannot demonstrate that there was a 
necessity for the access across the Lawrence parcel for the benefit o f  the parcel 
allegedly leased by Tbwerwhen the Lawrence parcel was severed from the other 
land retained by Funk. Funk obviously had access to his other lands when he 
severed the parcel sold to Human Synergistics in 1 975, otherwise Funk would 
have taken great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to Human 
Synergistics in 1 975. 
It should be noted that the parcels of land at issue sit on top of a 
mountain. The lands are not suited for farming or residential development. The 
land is  suitable only for the maintenance of radio and phone towers. Nothing in 
the record establishes that anything but infrequent access to these sites i s  
commonplace. 
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EASEMENT BWPRSCRIPTION 
To establish an easement by prescription, a party must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence all of the elements necessary for a prescriptive 
easement. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 ldaho 225, 229; Abbot v. NampaSchoolDist. 
No. 131, 1 1  9 ldaho 544. Because it is no trivial thing to take another's land 
without compensation, easements by prescription are not favored by the law. 
Simmons v. Perkins, 63 ldaho 136. A prescriptive easement cannot be granted if 
the use of the servient tenement was by permission of  its owner, because such 
use, by definition, is not adverse to the rights of the owner. Simmons, Id. 
In the recent case Hughes v. Fisher, 142 ldaho 474, 129, P.3d 1223 (2006), 
the ldaho Supreme Court created an exception to the general rule that the 
regular crossing of another's property i s  presumed to be adverse. Where a 
landowner constructs a way over the land for his own use and convenience, the 
mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be 
presumed to be by way of permission. 
The conclusionary statements offered by Tower in support of its motion for 
summary judgment do not constitute clear and convincing evidence of adverse 
use that would benefit Tower in the instant case. Tower, itself, makes no claim 
of any sort that it has used the Lawrence parcel openly, notoriously, continuously 
and in a hostile manner for the statutory period. 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
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No prescriptive claim has been established and Towers use 05- the Lawrence 
access road has always been perrni~sive. '~ 
DATED this $7 day of July, 2007. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
ey for Defendants 
l2 See affidavits o f  Daniel Rebor and Douglas Lawrence. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ay ofJuly, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur dl Alene, ID 8381 4 
/US. Mail, postage prepaid Via: 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
